# American Institute of Mathematical Sciences

## The game of government-industry-university-institute collaborative innovation based on static game theory

 1 School of Public Management, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China 2 School of Management Engineering, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China 3 School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China

* Corresponding author: Peng Liu

Received  May 2019 Revised  June 2019 Published  February 2020

The collaborative innovation among government, industry, university and institute is key to improving the capability of independent innovation and development of social economy. The thesis is the first research to include the scientific research team as the main body of the game in the game analysis of government-industry-university-research cooperation, and the static game theory is used to establish two pairs of game models including the university and the institute, and the university and the industry respectively. Also, the earnings of the government is analyzed. The results show that the increase of their own investment will bring about the equilibrium earning of industry, university and institute; the equilibrium earning of the government and university is influenced by the active participation of the institute. With the increase of the participation of institutes, the equilibrium earning of government and university will also increase accordingly.

Citation: Peng Liu, Jinfeng Wang, Lijie Feng. The game of government-industry-university-institute collaborative innovation based on static game theory. Discrete & Continuous Dynamical Systems - S, doi: 10.3934/dcdss.2020276
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##### References:
Game matrix for academic part and the production party
 Academic party’s Academic party’s active cooperation passive cooperation Research party’s $\left( {A + {R_1} + \varepsilon {\alpha _1}T - \eta T - {\alpha _1}} \right)$, $\left( {A + {S_1}} \right)$, active cooperation $\left( {C + {R_2} + \left( {1 - \varepsilon } \right){\alpha _1}T + \eta T - {\alpha _2}} \right)$ $\left( {C + E - {\alpha _2}} \right)$ Research party’s $\left( {A + D - {\alpha _1}} \right)$ $A$ passive cooperation $\left( {C + {S_2}} \right)$ $C$
 Academic party’s Academic party’s active cooperation passive cooperation Research party’s $\left( {A + {R_1} + \varepsilon {\alpha _1}T - \eta T - {\alpha _1}} \right)$, $\left( {A + {S_1}} \right)$, active cooperation $\left( {C + {R_2} + \left( {1 - \varepsilon } \right){\alpha _1}T + \eta T - {\alpha _2}} \right)$ $\left( {C + E - {\alpha _2}} \right)$ Research party’s $\left( {A + D - {\alpha _1}} \right)$ $A$ passive cooperation $\left( {C + {S_2}} \right)$ $C$
The game matrix of the academic party and the production party
 Academic party’s Academic party’s active cooperation passive cooperation Production party’s $\left( {A + {Q_1} + {\alpha _1}T - {b_1}} \right)$ $\left( {A + S_1^{'}} \right)$ active cooperation $\left( {B + {Q_2} + {\alpha _2}T - {b_2}} \right)$ $\left( {B + F + {\alpha _2}T - {b_2}} \right)$ Production party’s $\left({A + {D^{'}} + {\alpha _1}T - {b_1}}\right)$ $A$ passive cooperation $\left( {B + {S_3}} \right)$ $B$
 Academic party’s Academic party’s active cooperation passive cooperation Production party’s $\left( {A + {Q_1} + {\alpha _1}T - {b_1}} \right)$ $\left( {A + S_1^{'}} \right)$ active cooperation $\left( {B + {Q_2} + {\alpha _2}T - {b_2}} \right)$ $\left( {B + F + {\alpha _2}T - {b_2}} \right)$ Production party’s $\left({A + {D^{'}} + {\alpha _1}T - {b_1}}\right)$ $A$ passive cooperation $\left( {B + {S_3}} \right)$ $B$
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