doi: 10.3934/dcdss.2020276

The game of government-industry-university-institute collaborative innovation based on static game theory

1. 

School of Public Management, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China

2. 

School of Management Engineering, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, China

3. 

School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China

* Corresponding author: Peng Liu

Received  May 2019 Revised  June 2019 Published  February 2020

The collaborative innovation among government, industry, university and institute is key to improving the capability of independent innovation and development of social economy. The thesis is the first research to include the scientific research team as the main body of the game in the game analysis of government-industry-university-research cooperation, and the static game theory is used to establish two pairs of game models including the university and the institute, and the university and the industry respectively. Also, the earnings of the government is analyzed. The results show that the increase of their own investment will bring about the equilibrium earning of industry, university and institute; the equilibrium earning of the government and university is influenced by the active participation of the institute. With the increase of the participation of institutes, the equilibrium earning of government and university will also increase accordingly.

Citation: Peng Liu, Jinfeng Wang, Lijie Feng. The game of government-industry-university-institute collaborative innovation based on static game theory. Discrete & Continuous Dynamical Systems - S, doi: 10.3934/dcdss.2020276
References:
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X. Y. Zang and Y. H. Ma, Research into decision-making mechanism of industry-university-institute cooperation under the perspective of collaborative innovation, Operations Research and Management Science, 27 (2018), 93-103.   Google Scholar

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H. Zhang, Study on evolutionary game mechanism of collaborative innovation and knowledge spillover, Chinese Journal of Management Science, 24 (2016), 92-99.   Google Scholar

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X. W. Zhang, The paths of industry-university collaborative innovation based on the knowledge function of university: An empirical survey from the united states, Science of Science and Management of S and T, 35 (2014), 100-109.   Google Scholar

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Y. ZhangL. R. Jian and S. F. Liu, Interests coordination mechanism of university-industry network cooperation based on optimized shapley value: A case study in industrial technology innovation strategy alliance, Chinese Journal of Management Science, 24 (2016), 36-44.   Google Scholar

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H. N. ZhuG. Y. Zhang and C. K. Zhang, An evolutionary game simulation on collaborative innovation behavior with opportunism, Science and Technology Management Research, 36 (2016), 13-18.   Google Scholar

show all references

References:
[1]

A. Q. BaigM. Naeem and W. Gao, Revan and hyper-revan indices of octahedral and icosahedral networks, Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences, 3 (2018), 33-39.  doi: 10.21042/AMNS.2018.1.00004.  Google Scholar

[2]

F. I. Bodas and R. Argou Marques, University-industry collaboration and innovation in emergent and mature industries in new industrialized countries, Research Policy, 42 (2013), 443-453.   Google Scholar

[3]

X. CaoJ. Yu and L. P. Zhang, Research on the stability of industry-university-research institute alliance: Based on market mechanisms and government regulations, Operations Research and Management Science, 25 (2016), 203-213.   Google Scholar

[4]

J. Chen and Y. Yang, Theoretical basis and content for collaborative innovation, Studies in Science of Science, 30 (2012), 161-164.   Google Scholar

[5]

J. ChenH. Yin and F. Xie, The evolutionary game simulation on industry-academy-research cooperation in collaborative innovation, Science and Technology Progress and Policy, 31 (2014), 1-6.   Google Scholar

[6]

Q. P. Ge and M. Y. Wang, The benefit assignment research on industry-university-research cooperative innovation strategy alliance based on modified asymmetric nash negotiation, Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 32 (2018), 79-83.   Google Scholar

[7]

Y. He, The theoretical model of i-u-r collaborative innovation, Studies in Science of Science, 30 (2012), 165-174.   Google Scholar

[8]

M. HemmertL. Bstieler and H. Okamuro, Bridging the cultural divide: Trust formation in university industry research collaborations in the US, Japan, and South Korea, Technovation, 34 (2014), 605-616.  doi: 10.1016/j.technovation.2014.04.006.  Google Scholar

[9]

J. H. JiangQ. F. Shi and Y. Yu, Modeling and simulation of system dynamics on knowledge transfer in industry-university-research cooperation, Information Science, 32 (2014), 50-55.   Google Scholar

[10]

M. D. KonigS. BattistonM. Napoletano and F. Schweitzer, Recombinant knowledge and the evolution of innovation networks, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 79 (2011), 145-164.  doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.01.007.  Google Scholar

[11]

Y. LiC. H. Yuan and T. Wang, How does government-industry-university-research-user collaborative innovation promote enterprise competitiveness?, Studies in Science of Science, 34 (2016), 1744-1757.   Google Scholar

[12]

H. D. Liu and Y. Tao, Analysis of evolutionary game of government-industry-university-institute cooperative innovation, Science and Technology Management Research, 36 (2016), 8-13.   Google Scholar

[13]

W. Y. LvY. Shen and C. N. Zheng, Study on government-industry-university-institute collaborative innovation based on tripartite evolutionary game, Chinese Journal of Management Science, 27 (2019), 162-173.   Google Scholar

[14]

A. Shvets and A. Makaseyev, Deterministic chaos in pendulum systems with delay, Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences, 4 (2019), 1-8.  doi: 10.2478/AMNS.2019.1.00001.  Google Scholar

[15]

S. ThorgrenJ. Wincent and D. Rtqvist, Designing interorganizational networks for innovation: An empirical examination of network configuration, formation and governance, Journal of Engineering and Technology Management, 26 (2009), 148-166.  doi: 10.1016/j.jengtecman.2009.06.006.  Google Scholar

[16]

Y. D. Wang and Z. H. Ai, The model analysis for technology transfer of industry -university -research collaborative innovation based on signaling game, Science and Technology Management Research, 35 (2015), 23-27.   Google Scholar

[17]

Z. B. WangY. Z. Han and T. Q. Hong, Analysis of the organization model and their advantages and disadvantages of industry-university-research synergetic innovation, Science and Technology Progress and Policy, 32 (2015), 24-29.   Google Scholar

[18]

J. WuX. X. Peng and Y. X. Sheng, Research on knowledge transfer cooperative game in university-industry cooperation based on dynamic control model, Chinese Journal of Management Science, 25 (2017), 164-171.   Google Scholar

[19]

W. W. Ye, L. Mei and W. Li, Dynamic mechanisms and incentive policies on cooperative innovation based on complex and systemically perspective, Management World, 79–91. Google Scholar

[20]

X. Y. Zang and Y. H. Ma, Research into decision-making mechanism of industry-university-institute cooperation under the perspective of collaborative innovation, Operations Research and Management Science, 27 (2018), 93-103.   Google Scholar

[21]

H. Zhang, Study on evolutionary game mechanism of collaborative innovation and knowledge spillover, Chinese Journal of Management Science, 24 (2016), 92-99.   Google Scholar

[22]

X. W. Zhang, The paths of industry-university collaborative innovation based on the knowledge function of university: An empirical survey from the united states, Science of Science and Management of S and T, 35 (2014), 100-109.   Google Scholar

[23]

Y. ZhangL. R. Jian and S. F. Liu, Interests coordination mechanism of university-industry network cooperation based on optimized shapley value: A case study in industrial technology innovation strategy alliance, Chinese Journal of Management Science, 24 (2016), 36-44.   Google Scholar

[24]

H. N. ZhuG. Y. Zhang and C. K. Zhang, An evolutionary game simulation on collaborative innovation behavior with opportunism, Science and Technology Management Research, 36 (2016), 13-18.   Google Scholar

Table 1.  Game matrix for academic part and the production party
Academic party’s Academic party’s
active cooperation passive cooperation
Research party’s $ \left( {A + {R_1} + \varepsilon {\alpha _1}T - \eta T - {\alpha _1}} \right) $, $ \left( {A + {S_1}} \right) $,
active cooperation $ \left( {C + {R_2} + \left( {1 - \varepsilon } \right){\alpha _1}T + \eta T - {\alpha _2}} \right) $ $ \left( {C + E - {\alpha _2}} \right) $
Research party’s $ \left( {A + D - {\alpha _1}} \right) $ $ A $
passive cooperation $ \left( {C + {S_2}} \right) $ $ C $
Academic party’s Academic party’s
active cooperation passive cooperation
Research party’s $ \left( {A + {R_1} + \varepsilon {\alpha _1}T - \eta T - {\alpha _1}} \right) $, $ \left( {A + {S_1}} \right) $,
active cooperation $ \left( {C + {R_2} + \left( {1 - \varepsilon } \right){\alpha _1}T + \eta T - {\alpha _2}} \right) $ $ \left( {C + E - {\alpha _2}} \right) $
Research party’s $ \left( {A + D - {\alpha _1}} \right) $ $ A $
passive cooperation $ \left( {C + {S_2}} \right) $ $ C $
Table 2.  The game matrix of the academic party and the production party
Academic party’s Academic party’s
active cooperation passive cooperation
Production party’s $ \left( {A + {Q_1} + {\alpha _1}T - {b_1}} \right) $ $ \left( {A + S_1^{'}} \right) $
active cooperation $ \left( {B + {Q_2} + {\alpha _2}T - {b_2}} \right) $ $ \left( {B + F + {\alpha _2}T - {b_2}} \right) $
Production party’s $ \left({A + {D^{'}} + {\alpha _1}T - {b_1}}\right) $ $ A $
passive cooperation $ \left( {B + {S_3}} \right) $ $ B $
Academic party’s Academic party’s
active cooperation passive cooperation
Production party’s $ \left( {A + {Q_1} + {\alpha _1}T - {b_1}} \right) $ $ \left( {A + S_1^{'}} \right) $
active cooperation $ \left( {B + {Q_2} + {\alpha _2}T - {b_2}} \right) $ $ \left( {B + F + {\alpha _2}T - {b_2}} \right) $
Production party’s $ \left({A + {D^{'}} + {\alpha _1}T - {b_1}}\right) $ $ A $
passive cooperation $ \left( {B + {S_3}} \right) $ $ B $
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