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M. Sotomayor, Connecting the cooperative and competitive structures of the multiple-partners assignment game, Journal of Economic Theory, 134 (2007), 155-174.doi: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.005.
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M. Sotomayor, The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules, International Journal of Game Theory, (Special Issue in honor of David Gale) 36 (2008), 621-640.doi: 10.1007/s00182-008-0115-8.
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M. Sotomayor, My encounters with David Gale, Games and Economic Behavior, 66 (2009), 643-646.
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M. Sotomayor, Adjusting prices in the multiple-partners assignment game, International Journal of Game Theory, 38 (2009), 575-600.doi: 10.1007/s00182-009-0171-8.
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M. Sotomayor, Modeling cooperative decision situations: The deviation function form and the equilibrium concept, Working paper, 2013.
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