A solution for discrete cost sharing problems with non rival consumption

Adriana Navarro-Ramos; William Olvera-Lopez

doi:10.3934/jdg.2018004

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2018, Volume 5, Issue 1: 31-39. Doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018004

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A solution for discrete cost sharing problems with non rival consumption

Adriana Navarro-Ramos^1, , and
William Olvera-Lopez^2,

1.
Universidade de Vigo, Statistics and Operations Research Program; Vigo, Spain
2.
UASLP, School of Economics; San Luis Potosí, SLP, Mexico

* Corresponding author: adnavarro@uvigo.es
* Corresponding author: adnavarro@uvigo.es

Received: April 2017

Revised: September 2017

Published: January 2018

The authors acknowledge support from CONACyT grant 240229.

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Abstract

In this paper we show several results regarding to the classical cost sharing problem when each agent requires a set of services but they can share the benefits of one unit of each service, i.e. there is non rival consumption. Specifically, we show a characterized solution for this problem, mainly adapting the well-known axioms that characterize the Shapley value for TU-games into our context. Finally, we present some additional properties that the shown solution satisfy.

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Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 91A12, 91A40; Secondary: 91A80.

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References

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