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Volume 5, 2018

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Volume 3, 2016

Volume 2, 2015

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The Journal of Dynamics and Games (JDG) is an applied mathematicsjournal that publishes high quality peer-review and expository papersin all research areas of expertise of its editors. The main focus ofJDG is in the interface of Dynamical Systems and Game Theory. Click here for more information

The submissions to JDG regular issues are done by email to the editors in chief or directly to one of the editors. The authors should ask for an email from the editors in chief confirming the reception of the paper.

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Imperfectly competitive markets, trade unions and inflation: Do imperfectly competitive markets transmit more inflation than perfectly competitive ones? A theoretical appraisal
Luis C. Corchón
2018, 5(3) : 189-201 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018012 +[Abstract](183) +[HTML](120) +[PDF](458.0KB)

In this paper we study the theoretical plausibility of the conjecture that inflation arises because imperfectly competitive markets (ICM in the sequel) translate cost pushes in large price increases. We define two different measures of inflation transmission. We compared these measures in several models of ICM and in perfectly competitive markets (PCM in the sequel). In each case we find a necessary and sufficient condition for an ICM to transmit more inflation -according to the two measures-than that transmitted by a PCM.

Equivalences between two matching models: Stability
Paola B. Manasero
2018, 5(3) : 203-221 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018013 +[Abstract](215) +[HTML](195) +[PDF](442.62KB)

We study the equivalences between two matching models, where the agents in one side of the market, the workers, have responsive preferences on the set of agents of the other side, the firms. We modify the firms' preferences on subsets of workers and define a function between the set of many-to-many matchings and the set of related many-to-one matchings. We prove that this function restricted to the set of stable matchings is bijective and that preserves the stability of the corresponding matchings in both models. Using this function, we prove that for the many-to-many problem with substitutable preferences for the firms and responsive preferences for the workers, the set of stable matchings is non-empty and has a lattice structure.

Critical transitions and Early Warning Signals in repeated Cooperation Games
Christian Hofer, Georg Jäger and Manfred Füllsack
2018, 5(3) : 223-230 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018014 +[Abstract](259) +[HTML](171) +[PDF](384.4KB)

Scanning a system's dynamics for critical transitions, i.e. sudden shifts from one system state to another, with the methodology of Early Warning Signals has been shown to yield promising results in many scientific fields. So far however, such investigations focus on aggregated system dynamics modeled with equation-based methods. In this paper the methodology of Early Warning Signals is applied to critical transitions found in the context of Cooperation Games. Since equation-based methods are not well suited to account for interactions in game theoretic settings, an agent-based model of a repeated Cooperation Game is used to generate data. We find that Early Warning Signals can be detected in agent-based simulations of such systems.

Strategic delegation effects on Cournot and Stackelberg competition
Nickolas J. Michelacakis
2018, 5(3) : 231-242 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018015 +[Abstract](65) +[HTML](27) +[PDF](304.41KB)

This paper compares the outcomes of two three-stage games of two firms competing for quantity with managerial delegation. In fact, we prove that simultaneous choice of managers by the proprietors of the firms followed by Stackelberg-type competition is equivalent to sequential choice of managers followed by Cournot-type competition. We prove equivalence in a general setting, namely, when the duopolistic model is characterised by a non-linear inverse demand function of the form \begin{document}$p_i = a-(q_i)^n-γ (q_j)^n$\end{document}, \begin{document}$i,j = 1,2$\end{document} and \begin{document}$n∈\mathbb{N}$\end{document}.

A bare-bones mathematical model of radicalization
C. Connell McCluskey and Manuele Santoprete
2018, 5(3) : 243-264 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018016 +[Abstract](66) +[HTML](60) +[PDF](432.4KB)

Radicalization is the process by which people come to adopt increasingly extreme political or religious ideologies. While radical thinking is by no means problematic in itself, it becomes a threat to national security when it leads to violence. We introduce a simple compartmental model (similar to epidemiology models) to describe the radicalization process. We then extend the model to allow for multiple ideologies. Our approach is similar to the one used in the study of multi-strain diseases. Based on our models, we assess several strategies to counter violent extremism.

General limit value in dynamic programming
Jérôme Renault
2014, 1(3) : 471-484 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2014.1.471 +[Abstract](520) +[PDF](385.9KB) Cited By(8)
Pure and Random strategies in differential game with incomplete informations
Pierre Cardaliaguet, Chloé Jimenez and Marc Quincampoix
2014, 1(3) : 363-375 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2014.1.363 +[Abstract](574) +[PDF](386.0KB) Cited By(6)
Existence of the uniform value in zero-sum repeated games with a more informed controller
Fabien Gensbittel, Miquel Oliu-Barton and Xavier Venel
2014, 1(3) : 411-445 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2014.1.411 +[Abstract](467) +[PDF](550.1KB) Cited By(6)
Discrete time dynamic oligopolies with adjustment constraints
Chrystie Burr, Laura Gardini and Ferenc Szidarovszky
2015, 2(1) : 65-87 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2015.2.65 +[Abstract](476) +[PDF](535.9KB) Cited By(4)
Reversibility and oscillations in zero-sum discounted stochastic games
Sylvain Sorin and Guillaume Vigeral
2015, 2(1) : 103-115 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2015.2.103 +[Abstract](452) +[PDF](364.9KB) Cited By(4)
Approachability, regret and calibration: Implications and equivalences
Vianney Perchet
2014, 1(2) : 181-254 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2014.1.181 +[Abstract](568) +[PDF](897.5KB) Cited By(4)
Nonzero-sum stochastic differential games with additive structure and average payoffs
Beatris Adriana Escobedo-Trujillo and José Daniel López-Barrientos
2014, 1(4) : 555-578 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2014.1.555 +[Abstract](620) +[PDF](527.0KB) Cited By(4)
Paths to stability in the assignment problem
Bettina Klaus and Frédéric Payot
2015, 2(3&4) : 257-287 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2015004 +[Abstract](583) +[PDF](538.5KB) Cited By(3)
Optimal strategies for operating energy storage in an arbitrage or smoothing market
Lisa C Flatley, Robert S MacKay and Michael Waterson
2016, 3(4) : 371-398 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2016020 +[Abstract](659) +[PDF](831.3KB) Cited By(3)
Dynamics of human decisions
Renato Soeiro, Abdelrahim Mousa, Tânia R. Oliveira and Alberto A. Pinto
2014, 1(1) : 121-151 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2014.1.121 +[Abstract](596) +[PDF](2417.1KB) Cited By(3)
Robust portfolio decisions for financial institutions
Ioannis Baltas, Anastasios Xepapadeas and Athanasios N. Yannacopoulos
2018, 5(2) : 61-94 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018006 +[Abstract](541) +[HTML](391) +[PDF](721.98KB) PDF Downloads(66)
Hyperopic topologies on $l^{∞}$
Paulo Klinger Monteiro, Jaime Orrillo and Rudy José Rosas Bazán
2018, 5(1) : 1-7 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018001 +[Abstract](775) +[HTML](316) +[PDF](346.6KB) PDF Downloads(55)
Critical transitions and Early Warning Signals in repeated Cooperation Games
Christian Hofer, Georg Jäger and Manfred Füllsack
2018, 5(3) : 223-230 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018014 +[Abstract](259) +[HTML](171) +[PDF](384.4KB) PDF Downloads(51)
Equivalences between two matching models: Stability
Paola B. Manasero
2018, 5(3) : 203-221 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018013 +[Abstract](215) +[HTML](195) +[PDF](442.62KB) PDF Downloads(44)
On the linearity property for allocation problems and bankruptcy problems
Joss Sánchez-Pérez
2018, 5(1) : 9-20 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018002 +[Abstract](479) +[HTML](286) +[PDF](333.3KB) PDF Downloads(38)
Constrained stochastic differential games with additive structure: Average and discount payoffs
Beatris Adriana Escobedo-Trujillo, Alejandro Alaffita-Hernández and Raquiel López-Martínez
2018, 5(2) : 109-141 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018008 +[Abstract](453) +[HTML](267) +[PDF](599.26KB) PDF Downloads(34)
Transitional dynamics, externalities, optimal subsidy, and growth
Enrique R. Casares, Lucia A. Ruiz-Galindo and María Guadalupe García-Salazar
2018, 5(1) : 41-59 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018005 +[Abstract](455) +[HTML](412) +[PDF](485.2KB) PDF Downloads(31)
Games with nested constraints given by a level structure
Francisco Sánchez-Sánchez and Miguel Vargas-Valencia
2018, 5(2) : 95-107 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018007 +[Abstract](541) +[HTML](255) +[PDF](386.75KB) PDF Downloads(29)
Pricing bond options in emerging markets: A case study
Guillermo Magnou, Ernesto Mordecki and Andrés Sosa
2018, 5(1) : 21-30 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018003 +[Abstract](548) +[HTML](264) +[PDF](329.0KB) PDF Downloads(27)
A solution for discrete cost sharing problems with non rival consumption
Adriana Navarro-Ramos and William Olvera-Lopez
2018, 5(1) : 31-39 doi: 10.3934/jdg.2018004 +[Abstract](482) +[HTML](242) +[PDF](295.3KB) PDF Downloads(27)




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