American Institute of Mathematical Sciences

Advanced
August  2015, 9(3): 353-373. doi: 10.3934/amc.2015.9.353

An improved certificateless strong key-insulated signature scheme in the standard model

Yang Lu 1, , Quanling Zhang 1, and  Jiguo Li 1,

1. 

College of Computer and Information Engineering, Hohai University, 8 Focheng Xilu, Nanjing, Jiangsu 211100, China, China, China

Received  August 2014 Revised  March 2015 Published  July 2015

Exposure of secret keys may be the most devastating attack on a public key cryptographic scheme since such that security is entirely lost. The key-insulated security provides a promising approach to deal with this threat since it can effectively mitigate the damage caused by the secret key exposure. To eliminate the cumbersome certificate management in traditional PKI-supported key-insulated signature while overcoming the key escrow problem in identity-based key-insulated signature, two certificateless key-insulated signature schemes without random oracles have been proposed so far. However, both of them suffer from some security drawbacks and do not achieve existential unforgeability. In this paper, we propose a new certificateless strong key-insulated signature scheme that is proven secure in the standard model. Compared with the previous certificateless strong proxy signature scheme, the proposed scheme offers stronger security and enjoys higher computational efficiency and shorter public parameters.
Keywords: malicious KGC attack, key replacement attack, standard model., Certificateless strong key-insulated signature, secret key exposure.
Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 94A60; Secondary: 11T7.
Citation: Yang Lu, Quanling Zhang, Jiguo Li. An improved certificateless strong key-insulated signature scheme in the standard model. Advances in Mathematics of Communications, 2015, 9 (3) : 353-373. doi: 10.3934/amc.2015.9.353
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show all references

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in Proc. ASIACRYPT 2003, Springer-Verlag, 2003, 452-473. doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-40061-5_29.  Google Scholar

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in Proc. ISC 2005, Springer-Verlag, 2005, 134-148. Google Scholar

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in Proc. AAECC 2006, Springer-Verlag, 2006, 379-396. doi: 10.1007/s00200-005-0183-y.  Google Scholar

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in Proc. ACNS 2007, Springer-Verlag, 2007, 443-458. doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-73489-5_5.  Google Scholar

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in Proc. PKC 2008, Springer-Verlag, 2008, 344-359. doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-78440-1_20.  Google Scholar

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in Proc. EUROCRYPT 2002, Springer-Verlag, 2002, 65-82. doi: 10.1007/3-540-46035-7_5.  Google Scholar

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in Proc. PKC 2003, Springer-Verlag, 2003, 130-144. doi: 10.1007/3-540-36288-6_10.  Google Scholar

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in Proc. ICICS 2004, Springer-Verlag, 2004, 465-479. Google Scholar

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in Proc. PKC 2006, Springer-Verlag, 2006, 105-122. doi: 10.1007/11745853_8.  Google Scholar

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in Proc. ICICS 2002, Springer-Verlag, 2002, 85-96. doi: 10.1007/3-540-36178-2_5.  Google Scholar

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in Proc. ASIACRYPT 2005, Springer-Verlag, 2005, 495-514. doi: 10.1007/11593447_27.  Google Scholar

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IET - Information Security, 7 (2013), 113-117. Google Scholar

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in Proc. PKC 2006, Springer-Verlag, 2006, 474-490. doi: 10.1007/11745853_31.  Google Scholar

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in Proc. ASIACCS 2007, ACM, 2007, 302-311. Google Scholar

[15]

Int. J. Network Sec., 6 (2008), 170-180. Google Scholar

[16]

in Proc. ISA 2009, Springer-Verlag, 2009, 200-209. Google Scholar

[17]

in Proc. CRYPTO 1984, Springer-Verlag, 1984, 47-53. doi: 10.1007/3-540-39568-7_5.  Google Scholar

[18]

Sci. China Inf. Sci., 53 (2010) 2005-2015. doi: 10.1007/s11432-010-4076-8.  Google Scholar

[19]

J. Syst. Software, 85 (2012) 1409-1417. Google Scholar

[20]

in Proc. CANS 2008, Springer-Verlag, 2008, 64-79. Google Scholar

[21]

J. Electronics (China), 26 (2009) 853-858. Google Scholar

[22]

J. Zhejiang Univ. Sci. A, 10 (2009), 1790-1800. Google Scholar

[23]

J. Shanghai Jiaotong Univ. (Sci), 16 (2011), 571-576. Google Scholar

[24]

in Proc. EUROCRYPT 2005, Springer-Verlag, 2005, 114-127. doi: 10.1007/11426639_7.  Google Scholar

[25]

in Proc. CIS 2006, Springer-Verlag, 2007, 470-480. doi: 10.1007/11941378_29.  Google Scholar

[26]

in Proc. CT-RSA 2008, Springer-Verlag, 2008, 203-220. doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-79263-5_13.  Google Scholar

[27]

Secur. Commun. Networks, 7 (2014) 445-454. Google Scholar

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in Proc. Crypt. Coding 2003, Springer-Verlag, 2003, 16-18. doi: 10.1007/978-3-540-40974-8_14.  Google Scholar

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in Proc. ACNS 2006, Springer-Verlag, 2006, 293-308. Google Scholar

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in Proc. ISPEC 2006, Springer-Verlag, 2006, 226-234. Google Scholar

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