# American Institute of Mathematical Sciences

November  2015, 9(4): 471-514. doi: 10.3934/amc.2015.9.471

## FORSAKES: A forward-secure authenticated key exchange protocol based on symmetric key-evolving schemes

 1 Data & Network Security Lab, Department of Computer Engineering, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran, Iran

Received  March 2014 Revised  March 2015 Published  November 2015

This paper suggests a model and a definition for forward-secure authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols, which can be satisfied without depending on the Diffie--Hellman assumption. The basic idea is to use key-evolving schemes (KES), where the long-term keys of the system get updated regularly and irreversibly. Protocols conforming to our model can be highly efficient, since they do not require the resource-intensive modular exponentiations of the Diffie--Hellman protocol. We also introduce a protocol, called FORSAKES, and prove rigorously that it is a forward-secure AKE protocol in our model. FORSAKES is a very efficient protocol, and can be implemented by merely using hash functions.
Citation: Mohammad Sadeq Dousti, Rasool Jalili. FORSAKES: A forward-secure authenticated key exchange protocol based on symmetric key-evolving schemes. Advances in Mathematics of Communications, 2015, 9 (4) : 471-514. doi: 10.3934/amc.2015.9.471
##### References:
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