Malleability and ownership of proxy signatures: Towards a stronger definition and its limitations

Sanjit Chatterjee; Berkant Ustaoğlu

doi:10.3934/amc.2020015

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2020, Volume 14, Issue 2: 177-205. Doi: 10.3934/amc.2020015

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Malleability and ownership of proxy signatures: Towards a stronger definition and its limitations

Sanjit Chatterjee^1, and
Berkant Ustaoğlu^2,

1.
Department of Computer Science and Automation, Indian Institute of Science, India
2.
Izmir Institute of Technology, Urla, Izmir, 35430 Turkey

Received: June 30, 2017

Revised: December 31, 2017

Early access: September 2019

Published: May 2020

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Abstract

Proxy signature is a cryptographic primitive that allows an entity to delegate singing rights to another entity. Noticing the ad-hoc nature of security analysis prevalent in the existing literature, Boldyreva, Palacio and Warinschi proposed a formal security model for proxy signature. We revisit their proposed security definition in the context of the most natural construction of proxy signature – delegation-by-certificate. Our analysis indicates certain limitations of their definition that arise due to malleability of proxy signature as well as signature ownership in the context of standard signature. We propose a stronger definition of proxy signature to address these issues. However, we observe that the natural reductionist security argument of the delegation-by certificate proxy signature construction under this definition seems to require a rather unnatural security property for a standard signature.

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Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 94A60; Secondary: 94A62.

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