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Ironwood meta key agreement and authentication protocol

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  • Number theoretic public-key solutions, currently used in many applications worldwide, will be subject to various quantum attacks, making them less attractive for longer-term use. Certain group theoretic constructs are now showing promise in providing quantum-resistant cryptographic primitives, and may provide suitable alternatives for those looking to address known quantum attacks. In this paper, we introduce a new protocol called a Meta Key Agreement and Authentication Protocol (MKAAP) that has some characteristics of a public-key solution and some of a shared-key solution. Specifically, it has the deployment benefits of a public-key system, allowing two entities that have never met before to authenticate without requiring real-time access to a third-party, but does require secure provisioning of key material from a trusted key distribution system (similar to a symmetric system) prior to deployment. We then describe a specific MKAAP instance, the Ironwood MKAAP, discuss its security, and show how it resists certain quantum attacks such as Shor's algorithm or Grover's quantum search algorithm. We also show Ironwood implemented on several "internet of things" (IoT devices), measure its performance, and show how it performs significantly better than ECC using fewer device resources.

    Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 94A60, 20F36, 68P25; Secondary: 81P94, 20G40, 20E36.

    Citation:

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  • Figure 1.  Ironwood Data Flows

    Figure 2.  Ironwood Protocol Flow

    Table 1.  Performance on MSP430, LPC1768 (in Cycles)

    Artin Length MSP430 LPC1768
    $ |\beta| $ $ |\beta'| $
    2626 5272 6002668 2026216
    2332 3580 4532480 1538472
    2414 3944 4862464 1648742
    3172 4266 5661952 1914009
    2168 4514 5101824 1728545
    3092 4698 5922048 2000312
    2978 3968 5297664 1792959
    2744 4420 5459456 1845502
    2430 4762 5479424 1854446
    2636 3600 4771840 1617670
    2659.2 4302.4 5309182 1796687
     | Show Table
    DownLoad: CSV

    Table 2.  Performance on MSP430, LPC1768, CC2650 (in ms)

    Artin Length MSP430 LPC1768 CC2650 48Mhz
    $ |\beta| $ $ |\beta'| $ 25MHz 48MHz (SST 5) (SST 2)
    2626 5272 240.1 42.2 42 42
    2332 3580 181.3 32.2 32 32
    2414 3944 194.5 34.3 34 35
    3172 4266 226.5 39.9 40 40
    2168 4514 204.1 36.0 36 36
    3092 4698 236.9 41.2 42 42
    2978 3968 211.9 37.4 37 37
    2744 4420 218.4 38.4 38 39
    2430 4762 219.2 38.6 39 39
    2636 3600 190.9 33.7 34 34
    2659.2 4302.4 212.4 37.4 37.4 37.6
     | Show Table
    DownLoad: CSV
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