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Pure and Random strategies in differential game with incomplete informations

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  • We investigate a two players zero sum differential game with incomplete information on the initial state: The first player has a private information on the initial state while the second player knows only a probability distribution on the initial state. This could be view as a generalization to differential games of the famous Aumann-Maschler framework for repeated games. In an article of the first author, the existence of the value in random strategies was obtained for a finite number of initial conditions (the probability distribution is a finite combination of Dirac measures). The main novelty of the present work consists in : first extending the result on the existence of a value in random strategies for infinite number of initial conditions and second - and mainly - proving the existence of a value in pure strategies when the initial probability distribution is regular enough (without atoms).
    Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 49N70; Secondary: 91A05.

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