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A prequential test for exchangeable theories

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  • We construct a prequential test of probabilistic forecasts that does not reject correct forecasts when the data-generating processes is exchangeable and is not manipulable by a false forecaster.
    Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 62A01; Secondary: 91A40.


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