Game dynamics and Nash equilibria

Yannick Viossat

doi:10.3934/jdg.2014.1.537

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2014, Volume 1, Issue 3: 537-553. Doi: 10.3934/jdg.2014.1.537

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Game dynamics and Nash equilibria

Yannick Viossat^1,

1.
CEREMADE, Université Paris-Dauphine, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, F-75775 Paris

Received: October 31, 2012

Revised: June 30, 2013

Published: June 2014

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Abstract

There are games with a unique Nash equilibrium but such that, for almost all initial conditions, all strategies in the support of this equilibrium are eliminated by the replicator dynamics and the best-reply dynamics.

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Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 91A22; Secondary: 34A34, 34A60.

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References

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