Article Contents
Article Contents

# Hamiltonian evolutionary games

• We introduce a class of o.d.e.'s that generalizes to polymatrix games the replicator equations on symmetric and asymmetric games. We also introduce a new class of Poisson structures on the phase space of these systems, and characterize the corresponding subclass of Hamiltonian polymatrix replicator systems. This extends known results for symmetric and asymmetric replicator systems.
Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 91A22, 37C10; Secondary: 34G20, 53D17.

 Citation:

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