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A Malthus-Swan-Solow model of economic growth
On the evolution of compliance and regulation with tax evading agents
1. | Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of International and European Economic Studies, 76 Patission Street, GR 10434 Athens, Greece, Greece |
References:
[1] |
M. G. Allingham and A. Sandmo, Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis, Journal of public economics, 1 (1972), 323-338.
doi: 10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2. |
[2] |
J. Andreoni, B. Erard and J. Feinstein, Tax compliance, Journal of Economic Literature, 36 (1998), 818-860. |
[3] |
A. Antoci, P. Russu and L. Zarri, Tax evasion in a behaviorally heterogeneous society: An evolutionary analysis, Economic Modelling, 42 (2014), 106-115.
doi: 10.1016/j.econmod.2014.06.002. |
[4] |
P. Bardsley, Tax Compliance Games with Imperfect Auditing, Research paper No. 548, The University of Melbourne Department of Economics, 1994. |
[5] |
G. S. Becker, Crime and punishment: An economic approach, Journal of Political Economy, 76 (1968), 169-217. |
[6] |
S. F. Brosnan, N. E. Newton-Fisher and M. Van Vugt, A melding of the minds: When primatology meets personality and social psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 13 (2009), 129-147.
doi: 10.1177/1088868309335127. |
[7] |
K. P. Chen and C. C. Chu, Internal control versus external manipulation: A model of corporate income tax evasion, Rand Journal of Economics, 36 (2005), 151-164. |
[8] |
European Commission, Taxation Trends in the European Union. Data for the Member States and Norway - National List of Taxes, Scientific report, 2009. |
[9] |
H. Gintis, Game Theory Evolving: A Problem-Centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Interaction, Second edition. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2009. |
[10] |
M. J. Graetz, J. F. Reinganum and L. L. Wilde, The tax compliance game: Toward an interactive theory of law enforcement, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 2 (1986), 1-32. |
[11] |
J. Greenberg, Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach, Journal of Economic Theory, 32 (1984), 1-13.
doi: 10.1016/0022-0531(84)90071-1. |
[12] |
M. W. Hirsch and S. Smale, Differential Equations, Dynamical Systems, and Linear Algebra, Academic Press New York, 1974. |
[13] |
J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, Evolutionary game dynamics, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 40 (2003), 479-519.
doi: 10.1090/S0273-0979-03-00988-1. |
[14] |
M. I. Kamien and N. L. Schwartz, Dynamic Optimization: The Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control in Economics and Management, Second edition. Advanced Textbooks in Economics, 31. North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1991. |
[15] |
V. Lipatov, Evolution of Tax Evasion, MPRA Paper No. 966, European University Institute, 2006. |
[16] |
J. F. Reinganum and L. L. Wilde, Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework, Journal of Public Economics, 26 (1985), 1-18.
doi: 10.1016/0047-2727(85)90035-0. |
[17] |
J. F. Reinganum and L. L. Wilde, Equilibrium verification and reporting policies in a model of tax compliance, International Economic Review, 27 (1986), 739-760.
doi: 10.2307/2526692. |
[18] |
L. Samuelson, Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, vol. 1, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997. |
[19] |
K. H. Schlag, Why imitate, and if so, how?: A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits, Journal of Economic Theory, 78 (1998), 130-156.
doi: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2347. |
[20] |
J. Slemrod, An empirical test for tax evasion, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 67 (1985), 232-238.
doi: 10.2307/1924722. |
[21] |
J. Slemrod and S. Yitzhaki, Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration, Handbook of Public Economics, 3 (2002), 1423-1470. |
[22] |
A. A. Vasin and P. A. Vasina, Tax Optimization Under Tax Evasion: The Role of Penalty Constraints, Working Paper Series No. 01/09, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS, 2002. |
[23] |
W. Wane, Tax Evasion, Corruption, and the Remuneration of Heterogeneous Inspectors, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2394, World Bank, 2000. |
[24] |
J. W. Weibull, Evolutionary Game Theory, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995. |
[25] |
S. Yitzhaki, Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis, Journal of Public Economics, 3 (1974), 201-202.
doi: 10.1016/0047-2727(74)90037-1. |
show all references
References:
[1] |
M. G. Allingham and A. Sandmo, Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis, Journal of public economics, 1 (1972), 323-338.
doi: 10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2. |
[2] |
J. Andreoni, B. Erard and J. Feinstein, Tax compliance, Journal of Economic Literature, 36 (1998), 818-860. |
[3] |
A. Antoci, P. Russu and L. Zarri, Tax evasion in a behaviorally heterogeneous society: An evolutionary analysis, Economic Modelling, 42 (2014), 106-115.
doi: 10.1016/j.econmod.2014.06.002. |
[4] |
P. Bardsley, Tax Compliance Games with Imperfect Auditing, Research paper No. 548, The University of Melbourne Department of Economics, 1994. |
[5] |
G. S. Becker, Crime and punishment: An economic approach, Journal of Political Economy, 76 (1968), 169-217. |
[6] |
S. F. Brosnan, N. E. Newton-Fisher and M. Van Vugt, A melding of the minds: When primatology meets personality and social psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Review, 13 (2009), 129-147.
doi: 10.1177/1088868309335127. |
[7] |
K. P. Chen and C. C. Chu, Internal control versus external manipulation: A model of corporate income tax evasion, Rand Journal of Economics, 36 (2005), 151-164. |
[8] |
European Commission, Taxation Trends in the European Union. Data for the Member States and Norway - National List of Taxes, Scientific report, 2009. |
[9] |
H. Gintis, Game Theory Evolving: A Problem-Centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Interaction, Second edition. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2009. |
[10] |
M. J. Graetz, J. F. Reinganum and L. L. Wilde, The tax compliance game: Toward an interactive theory of law enforcement, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 2 (1986), 1-32. |
[11] |
J. Greenberg, Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach, Journal of Economic Theory, 32 (1984), 1-13.
doi: 10.1016/0022-0531(84)90071-1. |
[12] |
M. W. Hirsch and S. Smale, Differential Equations, Dynamical Systems, and Linear Algebra, Academic Press New York, 1974. |
[13] |
J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, Evolutionary game dynamics, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 40 (2003), 479-519.
doi: 10.1090/S0273-0979-03-00988-1. |
[14] |
M. I. Kamien and N. L. Schwartz, Dynamic Optimization: The Calculus of Variations and Optimal Control in Economics and Management, Second edition. Advanced Textbooks in Economics, 31. North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1991. |
[15] |
V. Lipatov, Evolution of Tax Evasion, MPRA Paper No. 966, European University Institute, 2006. |
[16] |
J. F. Reinganum and L. L. Wilde, Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework, Journal of Public Economics, 26 (1985), 1-18.
doi: 10.1016/0047-2727(85)90035-0. |
[17] |
J. F. Reinganum and L. L. Wilde, Equilibrium verification and reporting policies in a model of tax compliance, International Economic Review, 27 (1986), 739-760.
doi: 10.2307/2526692. |
[18] |
L. Samuelson, Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, vol. 1, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1997. |
[19] |
K. H. Schlag, Why imitate, and if so, how?: A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits, Journal of Economic Theory, 78 (1998), 130-156.
doi: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2347. |
[20] |
J. Slemrod, An empirical test for tax evasion, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 67 (1985), 232-238.
doi: 10.2307/1924722. |
[21] |
J. Slemrod and S. Yitzhaki, Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration, Handbook of Public Economics, 3 (2002), 1423-1470. |
[22] |
A. A. Vasin and P. A. Vasina, Tax Optimization Under Tax Evasion: The Role of Penalty Constraints, Working Paper Series No. 01/09, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS, 2002. |
[23] |
W. Wane, Tax Evasion, Corruption, and the Remuneration of Heterogeneous Inspectors, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2394, World Bank, 2000. |
[24] |
J. W. Weibull, Evolutionary Game Theory, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995. |
[25] |
S. Yitzhaki, Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis, Journal of Public Economics, 3 (1974), 201-202.
doi: 10.1016/0047-2727(74)90037-1. |
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