Evolution and jump in a Walrasian framework

Elvio  Accinelli; Enrique  Covarrubias

doi:10.3934/jdg.2016015

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2016, Volume 3, Issue 3: 279-301. Doi: 10.3934/jdg.2016015

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Evolution and jump in a Walrasian framework

Elvio Accinelli^1, and
Enrique Covarrubias^1,

1.
Facultad de Economa de la UASLP, Aveninda Pintores S/N, San Luis Potosi, 78280

Received: May 2016

Revised: September 2016

Published: July 2016

Abstract / Introduction Related Papers Cited by

Abstract

Lower profit rates play an importan role in the evolution of an ownership private economy. We argue that if managers look to maximize profits rates, then the decision to change, to those branches, or technologies, that offer higher rates of profits, plays an important role in the characterization of economies. If managers choose to produce according to those technologies that promise higher profit rates, then along the time, the distribution of the firms over the set of available technologies change, and therefore the economic fundamentals change. Under conditions of imperfect information, the imitation of the most successful firms plays can a decisive role in deciding how to produce. Along a path of Walrasian equilibria, regular economies can become singular and if this occurs, big changes must be expected after decisions of the firms for the next period.

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Mathematics Subject Classification: D51, D21.

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