A new perspective on the classical Cournot duopoly

Rabah Amir; Igor V. Evstigneev

doi:10.3934/jdg.2017019

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2017, Volume 4, Issue 4: 361-367. Doi: 10.3934/jdg.2017019

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A new perspective on the classical Cournot duopoly

Rabah Amir^1, , and
Igor V. Evstigneev^2,

1.
Department of Economics, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242-1994, USA
2.
Department of Economics, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, UK

* Corresponding author
* Corresponding author

Received: April 2017

Revised: September 2017

Published: November 2017

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Abstract

The paper provides new conditions for the existence, uniqueness, and symmetry of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the classical Cournot duopoly.

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Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 91A10; Secondary: 91A40, 91A80, 91B24.

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References

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