Article Contents
Article Contents

# A solution for discrete cost sharing problems with non rival consumption

The authors acknowledge support from CONACyT grant 240229.
• In this paper we show several results regarding to the classical cost sharing problem when each agent requires a set of services but they can share the benefits of one unit of each service, i.e. there is non rival consumption. Specifically, we show a characterized solution for this problem, mainly adapting the well-known axioms that characterize the Shapley value for TU-games into our context. Finally, we present some additional properties that the shown solution satisfy.

Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 91A12, 91A40; Secondary: 91A80.

 Citation:

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