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Article Contents

# Strategic delegation effects on Cournot and Stackelberg competition

• This paper compares the outcomes of two three-stage games of two firms competing for quantity with managerial delegation. In fact, we prove that simultaneous choice of managers by the proprietors of the firms followed by Stackelberg-type competition is equivalent to sequential choice of managers followed by Cournot-type competition. We prove equivalence in a general setting, namely, when the duopolistic model is characterised by a non-linear inverse demand function of the form $p_i = a-(q_i)^n-γ (q_j)^n$, $i,j = 1,2$ and $n∈\mathbb{N}$.

Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 91B38; Secondary: 91B40.

 Citation:

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