# American Institute of Mathematical Sciences

July  2019, 6(3): 211-219. doi: 10.3934/jdg.2019015

## Social networks and global transactions

 School of Management, Yasuda Women's University, 6-13-1 Yasuhigashi, Hiroshima, 731-0153, Japan

* Corresponding author: Yuki Kumagai

Received  March 2019 Published  July 2019

In the repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring, Bhaskar and Obara [2] construct a belief-based mixed trigger strategy which may be modified to approximate full cooperation when a public randomisation device is available. By modifying their assumption about trading relationships, this paper generalises the model and demonstrates that without introducing public randomisations, long-run cooperation may be approximately sustained by mixed trigger strategies with delayed communication. By applying our model, we investigate when efficient trade is attainable in a nonmarket trading system of social networks by looking into a role of communication in long-run community enforcement of efficient trade.

Citation: Yuki Kumagai. Social networks and global transactions. Journal of Dynamics & Games, 2019, 6 (3) : 211-219. doi: 10.3934/jdg.2019015
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The stage-game payoffs
 $e$ $s$ $e$ $1, 1$ $-l, 1+g$ $s$ $1+g, - l$ $0$, $0$
 $e$ $s$ $e$ $1, 1$ $-l, 1+g$ $s$ $1+g, - l$ $0$, $0$

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