Market games and walrasian equilibria

Hervés-Beloso Carlos; Moreno-García Emma

doi:10.3934/jdg.2020004

Article Contents

2020, Volume 7, Issue 1: 65-77. Doi: 10.3934/jdg.2020004

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Market games and walrasian equilibria

Hervés-Beloso Carlos^1, , and
Moreno-García Emma^2,

1.
Universidad de Vigo, Spain
2.
Universidad de Salamanca, Spain

^* Corresponding author: Carlos Hervés-Beloso
^* Corresponding author: Carlos Hervés-Beloso

Received: April 30, 2019

Published: January 2020

This work is partially supported by Research Grants SA049G19 (Junta de Castilla y León), ECO2016-75712-P (Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad) and ECOBAS (Xunta de Galicia)

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Abstract

In this work, we recapitulate and compare the market game approaches provided by Shapley and Shubik [35] and Schmeidler [33]. We provide some extensions to economies with infinitely many commodities and point out some applications and lines for future research.

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Mathematics Subject Classification: 91B50, 91A40.

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References

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