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Permanence in polymatrix replicators

The author was supported by FCT-Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, under the project CEMAPRE - UID/MULTI/00491/2013 through national funds
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  • Generally a biological system is said to be permanent if under small perturbations none of the species goes to extinction. In 1979 P. Schuster, K. Sigmund, and R. Wolff [15] introduced the concept of permanence as a stability notion for systems that models the self-organization of biological macromolecules. After, in 1987 W. Jansen [9], and J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund [6] give sufficient conditions for permanence in the replicator equations. In this paper we extend these results for polymatrix replicators.

    Mathematics Subject Classification: 34D05, 34D20, 37B25, 37C75, 37N25, 37N40, 91A22.

    Citation:

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  • Figure 1.  Two different perspectives of the polytope $ \Gamma_{(2,2,2)} $ from Example 2 where the polymatrix replicator given by the payoff matrix $ A $ is defined. Namelly, the plot of its equilibria and three interior orbits (with initial conditions near the boundary of the polytope) that converge to the unique interior equilibrium, $ q $

    Table 1.  The vertices of $ \Gamma_{(2,2,2,2)} $ and the value of $ f(v_i) $, where $ f(x) = (x-q)^TAx\, $ and $ q = \left(\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2} \right) \in {\rm int}\left(\Gamma_{(2,2,2,2)}\right) . $

    Vertices of $ \Gamma_{(2,2,2,2)} $ $ f(v_i) $
    $ v_1=\left(1,0,1,0,1,0,1,0\right) $ $ -394 $
    $ v_2=\left(1,0,1,0,1,0,0,1\right) $ $ -4 $
    $ v_3=\left(1,0,1,0,0,1,1,0\right) $ $ -392 $
    $ v_4=\left(1,0,1,0,0,1,0,1\right) $ $ -6 $
    $ v_5=\left(1,0,0,1,1,0,1,0\right) $ $ -602 $
    $ v_6=\left(1,0,0,1,1,0,0,1\right) $ $ -592 $
    $ v_7=\left(1,0,0,1,0,1,1,0\right) $ $ -204 $
    $ v_8=\left(1,0,0,1,0,1,0,1\right) $ $ -198 $
    $ v_9=\left(0,1,1,0,1,0,1,0\right) $ $ -198 $
    $ v_{10}=\left(0,1,1,0,1,0,0,1\right) $ $ -204 $
    $ v_{11}=\left(0,1,1,0,0,1,1,0\right) $ $ -592 $
    $ v_{12}=\left(0,1,1,0,0,1,0,1\right) $ $ -602 $
    $ v_{13}=\left(0,1,0,1,1,0,1,0\right) $ $ -6 $
    $ v_{14}=\left(0,1,0,1,1,0,0,1\right) $ $ -392 $
    $ v_{15}=\left(0,1,0,1,0,1,1,0\right) $ $ -4 $
    $ v_{16}=\left(0,1,0,1,0,1,0,1\right) $ $ -394 $
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    Table 2.  The equilibria on $ 3d $-faces of $ \Gamma_{(2,2,2,2)} $ and the value of $ f(q_i) $, where $ f(x) = (x-q)^TAx\, $ and $ q = \left(\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2} \right) \in {\rm int}\left(\Gamma_{(2,2,2,2)}\right) . $

    Equilibria on $ 3d $-faces of $ \Gamma_{(2,2,2,2)} $ $ f(q_i) $
    $ q_1=\left(0.05266, 0.9473, 0.93275, 0.0672483, 0.991199,\frac{9049}{1028189}, 0, 1\right) $ $ -201.7 $
    $ q_2=\left( 0.9473, 0.05266, 0.0672483, 0.93275,\frac{9049}{1028189}, 0.991199, 1, 0 \right) $ $ -201.7 $
     | Show Table
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    Table 3.  The equilibria on $ 2d $-faces of $ \Gamma_{(2,2,2,2)} $ and the value of $ f(q_i) $, where $ f(x) = (x-q)^TAx\, $ and $ q = \left(\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2} \right) \in {\rm int}\left(\Gamma_{(2,2,2,2)}\right) . $

    Equilibria on $ 2d $-faces of $ \Gamma_{(2,2,2,2)} $ $ f(q_i) $
    $ q_3=\left(0,1,0,1,\frac{9803}{29100},\frac{19297}{29100},\frac{893}{2910},\frac{2017}{2910}\right) $ $ -19.2 $
    $ q_4=\left(0,1,1,0,\frac{9649}{14550},\frac{4901}{14550},\frac{994}{1455},\frac{461}{1455}\right) $ $ -76.7 $
    $ q_5=\left(0,1,\frac{171}{400},\frac{229}{400},\frac{29}{40},\frac{11}{40},0,1\right) $ $ -197.4 $
    $ q_6=\left(1,0,0,1,\frac{4901}{14550},\frac{9649}{14550},\frac{461}{1455},\frac{994}{1455}\right) $ $ -76.7 $
    $ q_7=\left(1,0,1,0,\frac{19297}{29100},\frac{9803}{29100},\frac{2017}{2910},\frac{893}{2910}\right) $ $ -19.2 $
    $ q_8=\left(1,0,\frac{229}{400},\frac{171}{400},\frac{11}{40},\frac{29}{40},1,0\right) $ $ -197.4 $
     | Show Table
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    Table 4.  The equilibria on $ 1d $-faces of $ \Gamma_{(2,2,2,2)} $ and the value of $ f(q_i) $, where $ f(x) = (x-q)^TAx\, $ and $ q = \left(\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2} \right) \in {\rm int}\left(\Gamma_{(2,2,2,2)}\right) . $

    Equilibria on $ 1d $-faces of $ \Gamma_{(2,2,2,2)} $ $ f(q_i) $
    $ q_9=\left(0,1,0,1,1,0,\frac{97}{100},\frac{3}{100} \right) $ $ -5.94 $
    $ q_{10}=\left(1,0,1,0,0,1,\frac{3}{100},\frac{97}{100} \right) $ $ -5.94 $
    $ q_{11}=\left(0,1,1,0,0,1,\frac{1}{50},\frac{49}{50} \right) $ $ -593.96 $
    $ q_{12}=\left(1,0,0,1,1,0,\frac{49}{50},\frac{1}{50} \right) $ $ -593.96 $
    $ q_{13}=\left(0,1,1,0,\frac{47}{95},\frac{48}{95},1,0 \right) $ $ -207.1 $
    $ q_{14}=\left(1,0,0,1,\frac{48}{95},\frac{47}{95},0,1 \right) $ $ -207.1 $
    $ q_{15}=\left(0,1,\frac{2}{5},\frac{3}{5},1,0,0,1 \right) $ $ -307.2 $
    $ q_{16}=\left(1,0,\frac{3}{5},\frac{2}{5},0,1,1,0 \right) $ $ -307.2 $
    $ q_{17}=\left(0,1,0,1,\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},0,1 \right) $ $ -203 $
    $ q_{18}=\left(1,0,1,0,\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},1,0 \right) $ $ -203 $
    $ q_{19}=\left(0,1,\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},0,1,0,1 \right) $ $ -488 $
    $ q_{20}=\left(1,0,\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},1,0,1,0 \right) $ $ -488 $
     | Show Table
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    [3] H. N. AlishahP. Duarte and T. Peixe, Asymptotic Poincaré maps along the edges of polytopes, Nonlinearity, 33 (2020), 469-510.  doi: 10.1088/1361-6544/ab49e6.
    [4] P. DuarteR. L. Fernandes and W. M. Oliva, Dynamics of the attractor in the Lotka-Volterra equations, J. Differential Equations, 149 (1998), 143-189.  doi: 10.1006/jdeq.1998.3443.
    [5] J. Hofbauer, On the occurrence of limit cycles in the Volterra-Lotka equation, Nonlinear Anal., 5 (1981), 1003-1007.  doi: 10.1016/0362-546X(81)90059-6.
    [6] J. Hofbauer and K. Sigmund, Permanence for Replicator Equations, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 1987. doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-00748-8_7.
    [7] J. Hofbauer and  K. SigmundEvolutionary Games and Population Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.  doi: 10.1017/CBO9781139173179.
    [8] J. Hofbauer, A general cooperation theorem for hypercycles, Monatsh. Math., 91 (1981), 233-240.  doi: 10.1007/BF01301790.
    [9] W. Jansen, A permanence theorem for replicator and Lotka-Volterra systems, J. Math. Biol., 25 (1987), 411-422.  doi: 10.1007/BF00277165.
    [10] A. J. Lotka, Elements of mathematical biology. (formerly published under the title Elements of Physical Biology), Dover Publications, Inc., New York, 1958. doi: 10.1002/jps.3030471044.
    [11] J. M. Smith, The logic of animal conflict, Nature, 246 (1973), 15-18.  doi: 10.1038/246015a0.
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    [18] J. von Neumann and  O. MorgensternTheory of Games and Economic Behavior, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1944. 
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