Tributes to Bill Sandholm

Dai Zusai; Ryoji Sawa; Man Wah Cheung; Ratul Lahkar; Jiabin Wu

doi:10.3934/jdg.2022009

Article Contents

2022, Volume 9, Issue 4: 323-350. Doi: 10.3934/jdg.2022009 open access

This issue Previous Article Preface Next Article Using chemical reaction network theory to show stability of distributional dynamics in game theory

Tributes to Bill Sandholm

1.
Tohoku University, Graduate School of Economics and Management and Research Center for Policy Design, Kawauchi 27-1, Aoba-ku, Sendai, Miyagi 980-8576, Japan
2.
University of Tsukuba, Department of Policy and Planning Sciences, Tennoudai 1-1-1, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8573, Japan
3.
Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, School of Economics, 111 Wuchuan Road, Shanghai 200433, China
4.
Ashoka University, Department of Economics, Sonipat, Haryana 131029, India
5.
University of Oregon, Department of Economics, 1285 University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403, USA

^*Corresponding author: Dai Zusai
^*Corresponding author: Dai Zusai

Received: December 2020

Revised: March 2022

Early access: May 2022

Published: October 2022

This work is supported by grants-in-aid for open access from Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University

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Abstract

In this paper, former students of Bill Sandholm provide summaries of Bill's academic contributions as a unifier of evolutionary game theory and also share their personal memories with Bill as a kind, friendly and dedicated mentor. The paper consists on five essays; first on the unification of EGT with the concept of revision protocols and his charming personality, second on stochastic dynamics, third on potential games, fourth on geometric aspects of Bill's analysis, especially on the projection dynamic, and fifth on applications to cultural evolution.

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Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 91A22, 91A14, 91A26, 91A25; Secondary: 90-10, 68T05.

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Figure 1. Structural framework

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Figure 2. Bill Sandholm with young scholars at a bar in Lund, Sweden, on the final day of Learning, Evolution and Games conference in 2018. He was with Ryoji Sawa, Segis and Luis Izquierdo, Erik Mohlin and Alex Rigos, as well as Dai behind the camera

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