Cooperation in problems of common-pool resources

Jesús Erubiel Ordaz-Cuevas; Joss Sánchez-Pérez

doi:10.3934/jdg.2023010

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2023, Volume 10, Issue 4: 390-402. Doi: 10.3934/jdg.2023010

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Cooperation in problems of common-pool resources

Jesús Erubiel Ordaz-Cuevas^1, and
Joss Sánchez-Pérez^2, ,

1.
University of Siena, Department of Economics and Statistics; Italy
2.
UASLP, Faculty of Economics; México

^*Corresponding author: Joss Sánchez-Pérez
^*Corresponding author: Joss Sánchez-Pérez

Received: August 2023

Early access: August 2023

Published: October 2023

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Abstract

In this work we study problems of common-pool resources from a cooperative point of view. In particular we analyse whether it is possible for agents to agree to form a coalition to coordinate their level of appropriation and thus, avoid the tragedy of the commons. For this purpose, we investigate how agents in a coalition choose their joint level of appropriation (depending on the behavior of appropriators outside such coalition). Finally, we propose a way of associating with each problem (of common-pool resources) a game with externalities and studied its Core.

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Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 91-11, 91A12, 91-10; Secondary: 91B15.

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References

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