Empowering of candidates and parties in single term vs re-election schemes

Fernanda Herrera López; David Cantala

doi:10.3934/jdg.2023019

Article Contents

2023, Volume 10, Issue 4: 337-369. Doi: 10.3934/jdg.2023019

This issue Previous Article Producer behavior with rules of origin Next Article Understanding the role of the environment on the dynamic of tourism and economic growth: New assumptions in terms of time and population growth rate

Empowering of candidates and parties in single term vs re-election schemes

Fernanda Herrera López^1, and
David Cantala^2, ,

1.
School of Global Policy and Strategy, University of California San Diego, USA
2.
Centro de Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México A. C, Mexico

^*Corresponding author: David Cantala
^*Corresponding author: David Cantala

Received: September 2023

Early access: October 2023

Published: October 2023

Abstract / Introduction Full Text(HTML) Figure(14) / Table(5) Related Papers Cited by

Abstract

Agenda setting is a key feature of political systems. We propose a novel approach to contrast the respective power of candidates and parties when bargaining over agenda, which consists in comparing the simulations of four institutional models: single term with candidates proposing, single term with parties proposing, two-term with candidates proposing and two-term with parties proposing. Valences of candidates and preferences for alternation of voters are two important components of the analysis. Simulations establish that two-term schemes are inefficient, while term limits is a second order component of the agenda setting bargaining, while the offering side is the main component.

Keywords:

Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 91A25, 91B12.

Citation:

Full Text(HTML)

Figure 1. Single term game with offers by parties

Download: Full-size image PowerPoint slide

Figure 2. Preferences of $ c_{2} $ with negative incumbency advantage

Download: Full-size image PowerPoint slide

Figure 3. Single term game with offers by candidates

Download: Full-size image PowerPoint slide

Figure 4. Preferences of $ B $ with negative incumbency advantage

Download: Full-size image PowerPoint slide

Figure 5. Two term game with offers by parties

Download: Full-size image PowerPoint slide

Figure 6. Single term game with offers by candidates

Download: Full-size image PowerPoint slide

Figure 7. Preferences of $ B $

Download: Full-size image PowerPoint slide

Figure 8. Stationary state with negative advantage

Download: Full-size image PowerPoint slide

Figure 9. Stationary state with large positive advantage

Download: Full-size image PowerPoint slide

Figure 10. Stationary state with mixed advantages

Download: Full-size image PowerPoint slide

Figure 11. Efficiency with varying advantages

Download: Full-size image PowerPoint slide

Figure 12. Share of power

Download: Full-size image PowerPoint slide

Figure 13. Preferences of $ c_{2} $ with positive incumbency advantage

Download: Full-size image PowerPoint slide

Figure 14. Preferences of $ A $ with positive incumbency advantage

Download: Full-size image PowerPoint slide

Table 1. Preference order with negative incumbency advantage

Preference	$\succeq_{c_{2}}$³
$\frac{k_{A}}{k_{B}}$	$<c$	$=c$	$>c$
Most Least	$B$ $A$	$A/B$ $B/A$	$A$ $B$

| Show Table

DownLoad: CSV

Table 2. Preference order with negative incumbency advantage

Preference	$\succeq_{B}$⁴
$\frac{m_{1}}{m_{2}}$	$<c$	$=c$	$>c$
Most Least	$c_{2}$ $c_{1}$	$c_{1}/c_{2}$ $c_{2}/c_{1}$	$c_{1}$ $c_{2}$

| Show Table

DownLoad: CSV

Table 3. Preference order of B

Preference	$\succeq_{B}$⁵
$\frac{m_{1}}{m_{2}}$	$<c$	$=c$	$>c$
Most Least	$c_{2}$ $c_{1}$	$c_{1}/c_{2}$ $c_{2}/c_{1}$	$c_{1}$ $c_{2}$

| Show Table

DownLoad: CSV

Table 4. Preference order with positive incumbency advantage

Preference	$\succeq_{c_{2}}$⁷
$\frac{k_{A}}{k_{B}}$	$<c$	$=c$	$>c$
Most Least	$B$ $A$	$A/B$ $B/A$	$A$ $B$

| Show Table

DownLoad: CSV

Table 5. Preference order with positive incumbency advantage

Preference	$\succeq_{A}$⁸
$\frac{m_{1}}{m_{2}}$	$<c$	$=c$	$>c$
Most Least	$c_{2}$ $c_{1}$	$c_{1}/c_{2}$ $c_{2}/c_{1}$	$c_{1}$ $c_{2}$

| Show Table

DownLoad: CSV

Related Papers

Cited by

References

[1]	J. H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America, University of Chicago Press, 1995.
[2]	K. Bawn, M. Cohen, D. Karol, S. Masket, H. Noel and J. Zaller, A theory of political parties: Groups, policy demands, and nominations in American politics, Perspectives on Politics, 10 (2012), 571-597.
[3]	J. M. Carey, R. G. Niemi, L. W. Powell and G. F. Moncrief, The effects of term limits on State Legislatures: A new survey of the 50 States, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 31 (2006), 105-134.
[4]	G. Cox and M. D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House, University of California Press, 1993.
[5]	B. A. Desmarais, R. J. La Raja and M. S. Kowal, The Fates of challengers in U.S. House Elections: The role of extended party networks in supporting candidates and shaping electoral outcomes, American Journal of Political Science, 59 (2015), 194-211. doi: 10.1111/ajps.12106.
[6]	A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy, Journal of Political Economy, 65 (1957), 135-150. doi: 10.1086/257897.
[7]	A. Glazer and M. P. Wattenberg, How will term limits affect legislative work?, in Legislative Term Limits: Public Choice Perspectives, B. Grofman (ed.), Studies in Public Choice, Springer, Dordrecht, 10 (1996), 37-46. doi: 10.1007/978-94-009-1812-2_3.
[8]	J. F. Flowers, A. A. Haynes and M. H. Crespin, The media, the campaign, and the message, American Journal of Political Science, 47 (2003), 259-273. doi: 10.1111/1540-5907.00018.
[9]	C. Green-Pedersen and P. B. Mortensen, Who sets the agenda and who responds to it in the Danish Parliament? A new model of issue competition and agenda-setting, European Journal of Political Research, 49 (2010), 257-281. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.01897.x.
[10]	F. Herrera López, Voting with preference for alternation, Ph.D. Thesis, Chapter 2, El Colegio de México, (2019), 39-75.
[11]	R. G. Holcombe and J. D. Gwartney, Political parties and the legislative principal-agent relationship, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 145 (1989), 669-675.
[12]	K. F. Kahn, The distorted mirror: Press coverage of women candidates for Statewide Office, The Journal of Politics, 56 (1994), 154-173. doi: 10.2307/2132350.
[13]	H. Klüver and I. Sagarzazu, Setting the agenda or responding to voters? Political parties, voters and issue attention, West European Politics, 39 (2016), 380-398. doi: 10.1080/01402382.2015.1101295.
[14]	M. McCombs, Setting the Ggenda: The Mass Media and Public opinion, Blackwell Publishers, 2004.
[15]	G. Serra, Polarization of what? a model of elections with endogenous valence, The Journal of Politics, 72 (2010), 426-437. doi: 10.1017/S0022381609990880.
[16]	G. Serra, Why primaries? The party's tradeoff between policy and valence, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 23 (2011), 21-51. doi: 10.1177/0951629810382805.
[17]	G. Serra, The electoral strategies of a populist candidate: Does charisma discourage experience and encourage extremism?, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 30 (2018), 45-73. doi: 10.1177/0951629817737860.
[18]	D. E. Stokes, Spatial models of party competition, The American Political Science Review, 57 (1963), 368-377.
[19]	R. M. Skinner, S. E. Masket and D. A. Dulio, 527 committees and the political party network, American Politics Research, 40 (2011), 60-84. doi: 10.1177/1532673X11420420.