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2007, Volume 3, Issue 4: 763-774. Doi: 10.3934/jimo.2007.3.763
This issue Previous Article Robust solutions of split feasibility problem with uncertain linear operator Next Article A global error bound via the SQP method for constrained optimization problem

Licensing schemes in Stackelberg model under asymmetric information of product costs

  • 1.

    School of Business Administration, North China Electric Power University, Beijing 102206, P R

  • 2.

    Academy of Mathematics and System Sciences, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100080, P R

Received:  August 31, 2006
Revised:  March 31, 2007
Published:  September 2007
Abstract Related Papers Cited by
    Abstract
  • Based on the conclusion that have been put forward by Sougata Poddar and Uday Bhanu Sinha (2002), in "The Role of Fixed Fee and Royalty in Patent Licensing", we construct a model to analyze the behavior of the patentee when the licensee have private information about its marginal product costs before licensing. In the paper, the patentee is not considered as an independent R&D institute anymore but an insider. Moreover, we extend the model to Homogeneous Stackelberg and present the patentee's optimal linear licensing schemes in the sense of maximizing its profits under the licensing contract. It is found that the expected profit of the patentee under the separating contract is higher than any pooling contract in this model.
    Mathematics Subject Classification: MSBM10.

    Citation:
    shu

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