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April  2017, 13(2): 1105-1123. doi: 10.3934/jimo.2016064

The optimal exit of staged investment when consider the posterior probability

Meng Wu and  Jiefeng Yang

School of Economic Mathematics, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, Cheng Du 610074, China

Received  February 2015 Revised  August 2016 Published  October 2016

The current main method to analyze the staged venture investment is some game models, which finally get the optimal contract between the venture entrepreneurs and the venture capitalists by constructing the participation constraint and the incentive constraint. But this method only considers the probability of the success of the project, and ignores whether the project itself is enforceable or not. This paper introduces the concept of the posterior probability, extends the Bergemann and Hege model from the single period to the multi period. Then by using the posterior probability and the successful chance of the project, this paper analyzes the numerous factors which influence the optimal design of the contract under three conditions, such as the fixed and the floating investment in multi-stage and the time when the successful result is related to the current investment quota. What's more, it dose not only give the optimal stop point but compares it in case of the information symmetry and the contrary condition in the floating multi-stage investment. At the same time, it pays attention to the importance of the posterior probability in the present multi-stage venture investment researches. Last but not the least, it provides a reference for the related researches and makes great significance to the venture investment practice.

Keywords: Venture investment, multi-stage, stop point, posterior probability.
Mathematics Subject Classification: M31, D63, C72.
Citation: Meng Wu, Jiefeng Yang. The optimal exit of staged investment when consider the posterior probability. Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization, 2017, 13 (2) : 1105-1123. doi: 10.3934/jimo.2016064
References:
[1]

D. Bergemann and U. Hege, Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning, Journal of Banking and Finance, 22 (1998), 703-735.  doi: 10.1016/S0378-4266(98)00017-X.  Google Scholar

[2]

D. A. Blum, Factors contributing to independent venture capital successful exits, Journal of Business & Economics Research, 13 (2015), 1-6.  doi: 10.19030/jber.v13i1.9074.  Google Scholar

[3]

D. J. Cumming and S. A. Johan, Venture capital and private equity contracting (Second Edition), Elsevier Science Academic Press, 2014 (2014), 633-675.   Google Scholar

[4]

S. Dahiya and K. Ray, Staged investments in entrepreneurial financing, Journal of Corporate Finance, 18 (2011), 1193-1216.   Google Scholar

[5]

P. Dietmar and J. Leisen, Staged venture capital contracting with ratchets and liquidation rights, Review of Financial Economics, 21 (2012), 21-30.   Google Scholar

[6]

R. Elitzur and A. Gavious, A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, European Journal of Operational Research, 144 (2002), 440-453.  doi: 10.1016/S0377-2217(02)00144-3.  Google Scholar

[7]

S. Espenlaub, A. Khurshed and A. Mohamed, Venture capital exits in domestic and cross-border investments, Journal of Banking & Finance, 53 (2015), 215-232.  doi: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.11.014.  Google Scholar

[8]

E.G. S. Félix, C. P. Pires and M. A. Gulamhussen, The exit decision in the European venture capital market, Quantitative Finance, 14 (2014), 1115-1130.  doi: 10.1080/14697688.2012.714903.  Google Scholar

[9] P. Gompers and J. Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle, MIT Press, Cambridge Mas, 1999.   Google Scholar
[10]

V. Gerasymenko and J. D. Arthurs, New insights into venture capitalists' activity: IPO and time-to-exit forecast as antecedents of their post-investment involvement, Journal of Business Venturing, 29 (2014), 405-420.  doi: 10.1016/j.jbusvent.2013.06.003.  Google Scholar

[11]

L. J. Hu and D. H. Pan, Decision-making on stage financing based on markov process, Systems Engineering, 2 (2003), 12-16.   Google Scholar

[12]

H. Z. Huang and C. H. Xu, Financial syndication and R & D, Economics Letters, 80 (2003), 141-146.  doi: 10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00087-9.  Google Scholar

[13]

Y. H. Jin, Y. Q. Xi and Z. X. Ye, Study of multi-period dynamic financial model of venture capital considering reputation, Systems Engineering Theory and Practice, 5 (2003), 76-80.   Google Scholar

[14]

Z. L. Liu and W. X. Xu, Decision-making on Stage Financing, Chinese Journal of Management, 9 (2002), 106-111.   Google Scholar

[15]

P. Maik and S. Bernhard, Exit control, capital structure and financial contracts in venture capital -a comment on BerglöF 1994, Social Science Research Network, (2006), 1-20.  doi: 10.2139/ssrn.889549.  Google Scholar

[16]

D. L. Muriel and P. Sophie, Venture capital syndication and the financing of innovation: Financial versus expertise motives, Economics Letters, 106 (2010), 75-77.  doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.10.004.  Google Scholar

[17]

J. Medin, Post Exit Operating Performance of PE-backed Firms: Evidence from Sweden, http://hdl.handle.net/2077/36445, (2014). Google Scholar

[18]

D. Neher, Staged financing: An agency perspective, Review of Economic Studies, 66 (1999), 255-274.  doi: 10.1111/1467-937X.00087.  Google Scholar

[19]

E. Ramy and G. Arieh, A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, European Journal of Operational Research, 144 (2003), 440-453.  doi: 10.1016/S0377-2217(02)00144-3.  Google Scholar

[20]

R. Repullo and J. Suarez, Venture capital finance: A security design approach, Review of Finance, 8 (2004), 75-108.   Google Scholar

[21]

Y. Suzuki, Commitment Problem, Optimal Incentive Schemes, and Relational Contracts in Agency with Bilateral Moral Hazard, Economics Society European Meeting, Stockholm, 2003. Google Scholar

[22]

A. Schwienbacher, Innovation and venture capital exits, The Economic Journal, 118 (2008), 1888-1916.  doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02195.x.  Google Scholar

[23]

M. L. Sang and B. Lee, Entrepreneur characteristics and the success of venture exit: An analysis of single-founder start-ups in the U.S, International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, 11 (2015), 891-905.   Google Scholar

[24]

Z. M. Wang and X. J. Chen, The Contextual Factors and Multi-Stage Risk Assessment in Simulated Investment Decisions, Psychological Science, 25 (2002), 7-9.   Google Scholar

[25]

S. S. Wang and H. L. Zhou, Staged financing in venture capital: Moral hazard and risks, Journal of Corporate Finance, 10 (2004), 131-155.   Google Scholar

[26]

Q. Yang and L. S. Yin, The decision model of multi-stage venture capital based on theory of option pricing, The theory and the advancement of science in management, 5 (2004), 95-97.   Google Scholar

[27]

J. J. Zheng, X. Tan and W. T. Fan, An incentive model with stocks based on principal-agent theory, Journal of management sciences in china, 8 (2005), 24-29.   Google Scholar

[28]

S. D. Zhang and D. X. Wei, Analysis on multi-stage investment game of double moral hazard in venture capital, Nankai Economics Studies, 54 (2008), 142-150.   Google Scholar

[29]

X. L. Zhang and B. Huo, A single contract of optimization of multi-period venture capital and its optimal exit, Mathematics in economics, 252 (2008), 148-155.   Google Scholar

[30]

J. J. Zheng, P. Zhang, W. L. Jiang and C. J. Rao, Venture capital exit dilemma and quantum equilibrium in presence of heterogeneous bidders, Journal of Management Sciences in China, 18 (2015), 62-71.   Google Scholar

show all references

References:
[1]

D. Bergemann and U. Hege, Venture capital financing, moral hazard, and learning, Journal of Banking and Finance, 22 (1998), 703-735.  doi: 10.1016/S0378-4266(98)00017-X.  Google Scholar

[2]

D. A. Blum, Factors contributing to independent venture capital successful exits, Journal of Business & Economics Research, 13 (2015), 1-6.  doi: 10.19030/jber.v13i1.9074.  Google Scholar

[3]

D. J. Cumming and S. A. Johan, Venture capital and private equity contracting (Second Edition), Elsevier Science Academic Press, 2014 (2014), 633-675.   Google Scholar

[4]

S. Dahiya and K. Ray, Staged investments in entrepreneurial financing, Journal of Corporate Finance, 18 (2011), 1193-1216.   Google Scholar

[5]

P. Dietmar and J. Leisen, Staged venture capital contracting with ratchets and liquidation rights, Review of Financial Economics, 21 (2012), 21-30.   Google Scholar

[6]

R. Elitzur and A. Gavious, A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, European Journal of Operational Research, 144 (2002), 440-453.  doi: 10.1016/S0377-2217(02)00144-3.  Google Scholar

[7]

S. Espenlaub, A. Khurshed and A. Mohamed, Venture capital exits in domestic and cross-border investments, Journal of Banking & Finance, 53 (2015), 215-232.  doi: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.11.014.  Google Scholar

[8]

E.G. S. Félix, C. P. Pires and M. A. Gulamhussen, The exit decision in the European venture capital market, Quantitative Finance, 14 (2014), 1115-1130.  doi: 10.1080/14697688.2012.714903.  Google Scholar

[9] P. Gompers and J. Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle, MIT Press, Cambridge Mas, 1999.   Google Scholar
[10]

V. Gerasymenko and J. D. Arthurs, New insights into venture capitalists' activity: IPO and time-to-exit forecast as antecedents of their post-investment involvement, Journal of Business Venturing, 29 (2014), 405-420.  doi: 10.1016/j.jbusvent.2013.06.003.  Google Scholar

[11]

L. J. Hu and D. H. Pan, Decision-making on stage financing based on markov process, Systems Engineering, 2 (2003), 12-16.   Google Scholar

[12]

H. Z. Huang and C. H. Xu, Financial syndication and R & D, Economics Letters, 80 (2003), 141-146.  doi: 10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00087-9.  Google Scholar

[13]

Y. H. Jin, Y. Q. Xi and Z. X. Ye, Study of multi-period dynamic financial model of venture capital considering reputation, Systems Engineering Theory and Practice, 5 (2003), 76-80.   Google Scholar

[14]

Z. L. Liu and W. X. Xu, Decision-making on Stage Financing, Chinese Journal of Management, 9 (2002), 106-111.   Google Scholar

[15]

P. Maik and S. Bernhard, Exit control, capital structure and financial contracts in venture capital -a comment on BerglöF 1994, Social Science Research Network, (2006), 1-20.  doi: 10.2139/ssrn.889549.  Google Scholar

[16]

D. L. Muriel and P. Sophie, Venture capital syndication and the financing of innovation: Financial versus expertise motives, Economics Letters, 106 (2010), 75-77.  doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.10.004.  Google Scholar

[17]

J. Medin, Post Exit Operating Performance of PE-backed Firms: Evidence from Sweden, http://hdl.handle.net/2077/36445, (2014). Google Scholar

[18]

D. Neher, Staged financing: An agency perspective, Review of Economic Studies, 66 (1999), 255-274.  doi: 10.1111/1467-937X.00087.  Google Scholar

[19]

E. Ramy and G. Arieh, A multi-period game theoretic model of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, European Journal of Operational Research, 144 (2003), 440-453.  doi: 10.1016/S0377-2217(02)00144-3.  Google Scholar

[20]

R. Repullo and J. Suarez, Venture capital finance: A security design approach, Review of Finance, 8 (2004), 75-108.   Google Scholar

[21]

Y. Suzuki, Commitment Problem, Optimal Incentive Schemes, and Relational Contracts in Agency with Bilateral Moral Hazard, Economics Society European Meeting, Stockholm, 2003. Google Scholar

[22]

A. Schwienbacher, Innovation and venture capital exits, The Economic Journal, 118 (2008), 1888-1916.  doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02195.x.  Google Scholar

[23]

M. L. Sang and B. Lee, Entrepreneur characteristics and the success of venture exit: An analysis of single-founder start-ups in the U.S, International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal, 11 (2015), 891-905.   Google Scholar

[24]

Z. M. Wang and X. J. Chen, The Contextual Factors and Multi-Stage Risk Assessment in Simulated Investment Decisions, Psychological Science, 25 (2002), 7-9.   Google Scholar

[25]

S. S. Wang and H. L. Zhou, Staged financing in venture capital: Moral hazard and risks, Journal of Corporate Finance, 10 (2004), 131-155.   Google Scholar

[26]

Q. Yang and L. S. Yin, The decision model of multi-stage venture capital based on theory of option pricing, The theory and the advancement of science in management, 5 (2004), 95-97.   Google Scholar

[27]

J. J. Zheng, X. Tan and W. T. Fan, An incentive model with stocks based on principal-agent theory, Journal of management sciences in china, 8 (2005), 24-29.   Google Scholar

[28]

S. D. Zhang and D. X. Wei, Analysis on multi-stage investment game of double moral hazard in venture capital, Nankai Economics Studies, 54 (2008), 142-150.   Google Scholar

[29]

X. L. Zhang and B. Huo, A single contract of optimization of multi-period venture capital and its optimal exit, Mathematics in economics, 252 (2008), 148-155.   Google Scholar

[30]

J. J. Zheng, P. Zhang, W. L. Jiang and C. J. Rao, Venture capital exit dilemma and quantum equilibrium in presence of heterogeneous bidders, Journal of Management Sciences in China, 18 (2015), 62-71.   Google Scholar

Figure 1.  The research framework and time line of decision
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Table 1.  Variable Definitions
NotationDefinition
$p_t$The probability of the project become successful when the project is "good"
$\alpha_t$The probability that VC concluded a project was "good" through its previous performance
$V_t$The expected return of VCs in the t period
$R$The Total return of the project
$C$The cost of VC
$\theta$The discount rate
$I$The fixed investment amount under fixed investment
$S$The return of EN when the project become successful
$e_k$Represents the effort of EN, $e_d$ indicates the minimum effort, $e_h$ indicates the maximum effort
$h_k$Represents the effort of VC, $h_d$ indicates the minimum effort, $h_h$ indicates the maximum effort
$K, K_T$Represents an investment stage
$E$The cost of supervision by VC
$\beta$The share ratio of EN
$D$The parameter which can represents the relationship between return and investment
$M$The parameter which can represents the relationship between the amount of investment and the posterior probability of the current period
Table Options

Download as excel

NotationDefinition
$p_t$The probability of the project become successful when the project is "good"
$\alpha_t$The probability that VC concluded a project was "good" through its previous performance
$V_t$The expected return of VCs in the t period
$R$The Total return of the project
$C$The cost of VC
$\theta$The discount rate
$I$The fixed investment amount under fixed investment
$S$The return of EN when the project become successful
$e_k$Represents the effort of EN, $e_d$ indicates the minimum effort, $e_h$ indicates the maximum effort
$h_k$Represents the effort of VC, $h_d$ indicates the minimum effort, $h_h$ indicates the maximum effort
$K, K_T$Represents an investment stage
$E$The cost of supervision by VC
$\beta$The share ratio of EN
$D$The parameter which can represents the relationship between return and investment
$M$The parameter which can represents the relationship between the amount of investment and the posterior probability of the current period
Table 1.  Some Specific Examples
pADCThe stop point
0.51000003400000.666671
0.5900008400000.400008
0.5700007400000.285722
0.61000005400000.333337
0.6900006400000.277783
0.71000009400000.158734
0.7900009400000.158735
0.71000008400000.178575
0.7900008400000.178576
0.71000007400000.204086
0.7900007400000.204087
0.71000006400000.238099
0.7900006400000.238101
0.71000005400000.285718
0.7900005400000.285719
0.7900004400000.357148
0.7800004400000.357149
0.7700004400000.357151
0.71000003400000.476194
0.7900003400000.476195
0.71000002400000.714289
0.7900002400000.714291
0.81000008400000.156254
0.8700008400000.156258
0.91000007400000.158734
0.9900003400000.370375
0.9800004400000.277783
Table Options

Download as excel

pADCThe stop point
0.51000003400000.666671
0.5900008400000.400008
0.5700007400000.285722
0.61000005400000.333337
0.6900006400000.277783
0.71000009400000.158734
0.7900009400000.158735
0.71000008400000.178575
0.7900008400000.178576
0.71000007400000.204086
0.7900007400000.204087
0.71000006400000.238099
0.7900006400000.238101
0.71000005400000.285718
0.7900005400000.285719
0.7900004400000.357148
0.7800004400000.357149
0.7700004400000.357151
0.71000003400000.476194
0.7900003400000.476195
0.71000002400000.714289
0.7900002400000.714291
0.81000008400000.156254
0.8700008400000.156258
0.91000007400000.158734
0.9900003400000.370375
0.9800004400000.277783
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