Article Contents
Article Contents

# Solutions for bargaining games with incomplete information: General type space and action space

• * Corresponding author
This work has been supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Projects Nos. 71210002 and 71671099. The authors are grateful to the anonymous referees for their constructive comments and suggestions.
• A Nash bargaining solution for Bayesian collective choice problem with general type and action spaces is built in this paper. Such solution generalizes the bargaining solution proposed by Myerson who uses finite sets to characterize the type and action spaces. However, in the real economics and industries, types and actions can hardly be characterized by a finite set in some circumstances. Hence our generalization expands the applications of bargaining theory in economic and industrial models.

Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 91A12, 91B26; Secondary: 91B02.

 Citation:

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