Supplier's investment in manufacturer's quality improvement with equity holding

Hong Fu; Mingwu Liu; Bo Chen

doi:10.3934/jimo.2019127

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March 2021, 17(2): 649-668. doi: 10.3934/jimo.2019127

Supplier's investment in manufacturer's quality improvement with equity holding

Hong Fu ^1,2, , Mingwu Liu ^3, and Bo Chen ^1,,

1.	School of Management, Hefei University of Technology, Hefei 230009, China
2.	Key Laboratory of Process Optimization and Intelligent Decision-Making, Ministry of Education, Hefei 230009, China
3.	School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China

^* Corresponding author: Bo Chen, okchenbo@mail.ustc.edu.cn

Received December 2018 Revised April 2019 Published March 2021 Early access October 2019

This paper considers a supply chain in which an upstream supplier sells a component to a downstream manufacturer facing a price and quality sensitive demand. The supplier has a chance to make investment in the manufacturer, which can not only enable the supplier to hold equity shares in the manufacturer and thus achieve profit sharing with the manufacturer, but also provide resources for the manufacturer to improve its product quality. Under any given investment strategy of the supplier, the equilibrium decisions of the two chain members on wholesale price and profit margin are characterized. Then, the supplier's optimal investment strategy is derived. The paper considers three competition models: supplier Stackelberg (SS), manufacturer Stackelberg (MS), and vertical Nash (VN) models, which correspond to different market power structures. The paper shows that the investment can always increase the market demand. Moreover, in both the SS and VN models, the value of the supplier's investment for the entire supply chain, comes from not only the quality improvement but also the profit sharing caused by equity holding; while in the MS model, the investment value comes only from the quality improvement.

Keywords: Supply chain management, quality improvement, equity holding, market power structure, game theory.

Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 90B30, 90B50; Secondary: 91A10.

Citation: Hong Fu, Mingwu Liu, Bo Chen. Supplier's investment in manufacturer's quality improvement with equity holding. Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization, 2021, 17 (2) : 649-668. doi: 10.3934/jimo.2019127

References:

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[7]	G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: Strengths and limitations, Management Science, 51 (2005), 30-44. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215. Google Scholar
[8]	G. H. Chao, S. M. Iravani and R. C. Savaskan, Quality improvement incentives and product recall cost sharing contracts, Management Science, 55 (2009), 1122-1138. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1090.1008. Google Scholar
[9]	J. Chen, L. Liang and F. Yang, Cooperative quality investment in outsourcing, Internat. J. Prod. Econ., 162 (2015), 174-191. doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.01.019. Google Scholar
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[13]	D. Flath, Vertical integration by means of shareholding interlocks, Internat. J. Industrial Org., 7 (1989), 369-380. doi: 10.1016/0167-7187(89)90004-0. Google Scholar
[14]	H. Fu, Y. Ma and X. Cai, Downstream firm's investment with equity holding in decentralized assembly systems, Omega, 75 (2018), 27-56. doi: 10.1016/j.omega.2017.02.002. Google Scholar
[15]	H. Fu, Y. Ma, D. Ni and X. Cai, Coordinating a decentralized hybrid push-pull assembly system with unreliable supply and uncertain demand, Ann. Oper. Res., 257 (2017), 537-557. doi: 10.1007/s10479-015-1865-x. Google Scholar
[16]	C. Gaigné, K. Latouche and S. Turolla, Vertical ownership and export performance: Firm-level evidence from France, American J. Agricultural Econ., 100 (2017), 46-72. Google Scholar
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[22]	F. Höffler and S. Kranz, Imperfect legal unbundling of monopolistic bottlenecks, J. Regulatory Econom., 39 (2011), 273-292. doi: 10.1007/s11149-011-9144-5. Google Scholar
[23]	F. Höffler and S. Kranz, Legal unbundling can be a golden mean between vertical integration and ownership separation, Internat. J. Industr. Organization, 29 (2011), 576-588. doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2011.01.001. Google Scholar
[24]	M. Hunold, Backward ownership, uniform pricing and entry deterrence, working paper, 2017. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/158026. Google Scholar
[25]	M. Hunold and K. Stahl, Passive vertical integration and strategic delegation, The Rand Journal of Economics, 47 (2016), 891-913. doi: 10.1111/1756-2171.12158. Google Scholar
[26]	A. P. Jeuland and S. M. Shugan, Managing channel profits, Marketing Sci., 2 (1983), 239-272. doi: 10.1287/mksc.1070.0332. Google Scholar
[27]	M. Kaya and Ö. Özer, Quality risk in outsourcing: Noncontractible product quality and private quality cost information, Naval Res. Logist., 56 (2009), 669-685. doi: 10.1002/nav.20372. Google Scholar
[28]	M. Kroll, P. Wright and R. A. Heiens, The contribution of product quality to competitive advantage: Impacts on systematic variance and unexplained variance in returns, Strategic Manag. J., 20 (1999), 375-384. Google Scholar
[29]	C. K. Lee, Samsung-BYD link could open EV market, Korea Joongang Daily, 2016. Available from: http://koreajo\ongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=3021751. Google Scholar
[30]	M. Leng, Z. Li and L. Liang, Implications for the role of retailers in quality assurance, Produc. Oper. Manag., 25 (2016), 779-790. doi: 10.1111/poms.12501. Google Scholar
[31]	D. Li and A. Nagurney, A general multitiered supply chain network model of quality competition with suppliers, Internat. J. Produc. Econom., 170 (2015), 336-356. Google Scholar
[32]	W. Li and J. Chen, Backward integration strategy in a retailer Stackelberg supply chain, Omega, 75 (2018), 118-130. doi: 10.1016/j.omega.2017.03.002. Google Scholar
[33]	P. Ma, H. Wang and J. Shang, Contract design for two-stage supply chain coordination: Integrating manufacturer-quality and retailer-marketing efforts, Internat. J. Produc. Econom., 146 (2013), 745-755. doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2013.09.004. Google Scholar
[34]	P. Ma, H. Wang and J. Shang, Supply chain channel strategies with quality and marketing effort-dependent demand, Internat. J. Produc. Econom., 144 (2013), 572-581. doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2013.04.020. Google Scholar
[35]	N. M. Modak and S. Panda, Bargaining end customer prices for supply chain coordination in a declining price sensitive market, Internat. J. Manag. Sci. and Engineering Manag., 12 (2017), 68-78. doi: 10.1080/17509653.2015.1125309. Google Scholar
[36]	N. M. Modak, S. Panda and S. S. Sana, Two-echelon supply chain coordination among manufacturer and duopolies retailers with recycling facility, Internat. J. Adv. Manufac. Techn., 87 (2016), 1531-1546. doi: 10.1007/s00170-015-8094-y. Google Scholar
[37]	J. Z. Ni, B. B. Flynn and F. R. Jacobs, Impact of product recall announcements on retailers' financial value, Internat. J. Produc. Econom., 153 (2014), 309-322. doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2014.03.014. Google Scholar
[38]	R. Raj, Samsung invests $450mn in Chinese auto firm, Inshorts, 2016. Available from: https://www.inshorts.com/news/samsung-invests-%24450mn-in-chinese-auto-firm-1469124594106. Google Scholar
[39]	M. Seifbarghy, K. Nouhi and A. Mahmoudi, Contract design in a supply chain considering price and quality dependent demand with customer segmentation, Internat. J. Produc. Econom., 167 (2015), 108-118. doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.05.004. Google Scholar
[40]	X. F. Shao and J. H. Ji, Effects of sourcing structure on performance in a multiple-product assemble-to-order supply chain, European J. Oper. Res., 192 (2009), 981-1000. doi: 10.1016/j.ejor.2007.10.014. Google Scholar
[41]	K. Sharma, Factors determining India's export performance, J. Asian Econom., 14 (2003), 435-446. doi: 10.1016/S1049-0078(03)00036-8. Google Scholar
[42]	A. Sohdi, Temasek, IDG, Qualcomm lead $90m round for Xiaomi, AltAssets, 2011. Available from: https://www.altassets.net/private-equity-news/by-news-type/deal-news/temasek-idg-qualcomm-lead-90m-round-for-xiaomi.html. Google Scholar
[43]	G. Sošić, Impact of demand uncertainty on stability of supplier alliances in assembly models, Produc. Oper. Manag., 20 (2011), 905-920. doi: 10.1111/j.1937-5956.2010.01208.x. Google Scholar
[44]	G. Xie, W. Yue, S. Wang and K. K. Lai, Quality investment and price decision in a risk-averse supply chain, European J. Oper. Res., 214 (2011), 403-410. doi: 10.1016/j.ejor.2011.04.036. Google Scholar
[45]	X. Xu, Optimal price and product quality decisions in a distribution channel, Management Sci., 55 (2009), 1347-1352. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1090.1023. Google Scholar
[46]	D. Yang and T. Xiao, Coordination of a supply chain with loss-averse consumers in service quality, Internat. J. Produc. Res., 55 (2017), 3411-3430. doi: 10.1080/00207543.2016.1241444. Google Scholar
[47]	S. Yin, Alliance formation among perfectly complementary suppliers in a price-sensitive assembly system, Manufac. Service Oper. Manag., 12 (2010), 527-544. doi: 10.1287/msom.1090.0283. Google Scholar
[48]	J. Yu and S. Ma, Impact of decision sequence of pricing and quality investment in decentralized assembly system, J. Manufac. Systems, 32 (2013), 664-679. doi: 10.1016/j.jmsy.2013.02.004. Google Scholar
[49]	K. Zhu, R. Q. Zhang and F. Tsung, Pushing quality improvement along supply chains, Management Sci., 53 (2007), 421-436. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0634. Google Scholar

show all references

References:

[1]	M. S. Altug and G. Ryzin, Product quality selection: Contractual agreements and supplier competition in an assemble-to-order environment, Internat. J. Produc. Econ., 141 (2013), 626-638. doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2012.09.023. Google Scholar
[2]	R. Attri and S. Grover, Analysis of quality enabled factors in the product design stage of a production system life cycle: A relationship modelling approach, Internat. J. Manag. Sci. Engineering Manag., 13 (2018), 65-73. doi: 10.1080/17509653.2017.1298480. Google Scholar
[3]	R. D. Banker, I. Khosla and K. K. Sinha, Quality and competition, Management Science, 44 (1998), 1179-1192. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.44.9.1179. Google Scholar
[4]	V. Baulkaran, Management entrenchment and the valuation discount of dual class firms, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 54 (2014), 70-81. doi: 10.1016/j.qref.2013.08.001. Google Scholar
[5]	D. Brito, L. Cabral and H. Vasconcelos, Competitive effects of partial control in an input supplier, working paper, 2016. Available from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2814072. Google Scholar
[6]	G. P. Cachon, Supply chain coordination with contracts, Handbooks in Operations Research and Management Science, 11, Elsevier, 2003, 227–339. doi: 10.1016/S0927-0507(03)11006-7. Google Scholar
[7]	G. P. Cachon and M. A. Lariviere, Supply chain coordination with revenue-sharing contracts: Strengths and limitations, Management Science, 51 (2005), 30-44. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1040.0215. Google Scholar
[8]	G. H. Chao, S. M. Iravani and R. C. Savaskan, Quality improvement incentives and product recall cost sharing contracts, Management Science, 55 (2009), 1122-1138. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1090.1008. Google Scholar
[9]	J. Chen, L. Liang and F. Yang, Cooperative quality investment in outsourcing, Internat. J. Prod. Econ., 162 (2015), 174-191. doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.01.019. Google Scholar
[10]	J. Chen, L. Liang, D. Q. Yao and S. Sun, Price and quality decisions in dual-channel supply chains, European J. Oper. Res., 259 (2017), 935-948. doi: 10.1016/j.ejor.2016.11.016. Google Scholar
[11]	T. K. Das and B. S. Teng, A resource-based theory of strategic alliances, J. Manag., 26 (2000), 31-61. doi: 10.1177/014920630002600105. Google Scholar
[12]	C. S. Eun and S. Janakiramanan, A model of international asset pricing with a constraint on the foreign equity ownership, J. Finance, 41 (1986), 897-914. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04555.x. Google Scholar
[13]	D. Flath, Vertical integration by means of shareholding interlocks, Internat. J. Industrial Org., 7 (1989), 369-380. doi: 10.1016/0167-7187(89)90004-0. Google Scholar
[14]	H. Fu, Y. Ma and X. Cai, Downstream firm's investment with equity holding in decentralized assembly systems, Omega, 75 (2018), 27-56. doi: 10.1016/j.omega.2017.02.002. Google Scholar
[15]	H. Fu, Y. Ma, D. Ni and X. Cai, Coordinating a decentralized hybrid push-pull assembly system with unreliable supply and uncertain demand, Ann. Oper. Res., 257 (2017), 537-557. doi: 10.1007/s10479-015-1865-x. Google Scholar
[16]	C. Gaigné, K. Latouche and S. Turolla, Vertical ownership and export performance: Firm-level evidence from France, American J. Agricultural Econ., 100 (2017), 46-72. Google Scholar
[17]	I. Giannoccaro and P. Pontrandolfo, Supply chain coordination by revenue sharing contracts, Internat. J. Produc. Econ., 92 (2004), 131-139. doi: 10.1016/S0925-5273(03)00047-1. Google Scholar
[18]	P. Greenlee and A. Raskovich, Partial vertical ownership, European Econ. Review, 50 (2006), 1017-1041. Google Scholar
[19]	A. Ha, X. Long and J. Nasiry, Quality in supply chain encroachment, Manufac. Service Oper. Manag., 18 (2015), 280-298. doi: 10.1287/msom.2015.0562. Google Scholar
[20]	Y. He, Q. Xu, B. Xu and P. Wu, Supply chain coordination in quality improvement with reference effects, J. Oper. Res. Society, 67 (2016), 1158-1168. doi: 10.1057/jors.2016.10. Google Scholar
[21]	J. B. Heide and G. John, Alliances in industrial purchasing: The determinants of joint action in buyer-supplier relationships, J. Marketing Res., 27 (1990), 24-36. doi: 10.2307/3172548. Google Scholar
[22]	F. Höffler and S. Kranz, Imperfect legal unbundling of monopolistic bottlenecks, J. Regulatory Econom., 39 (2011), 273-292. doi: 10.1007/s11149-011-9144-5. Google Scholar
[23]	F. Höffler and S. Kranz, Legal unbundling can be a golden mean between vertical integration and ownership separation, Internat. J. Industr. Organization, 29 (2011), 576-588. doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2011.01.001. Google Scholar
[24]	M. Hunold, Backward ownership, uniform pricing and entry deterrence, working paper, 2017. Available from: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/158026. Google Scholar
[25]	M. Hunold and K. Stahl, Passive vertical integration and strategic delegation, The Rand Journal of Economics, 47 (2016), 891-913. doi: 10.1111/1756-2171.12158. Google Scholar
[26]	A. P. Jeuland and S. M. Shugan, Managing channel profits, Marketing Sci., 2 (1983), 239-272. doi: 10.1287/mksc.1070.0332. Google Scholar
[27]	M. Kaya and Ö. Özer, Quality risk in outsourcing: Noncontractible product quality and private quality cost information, Naval Res. Logist., 56 (2009), 669-685. doi: 10.1002/nav.20372. Google Scholar
[28]	M. Kroll, P. Wright and R. A. Heiens, The contribution of product quality to competitive advantage: Impacts on systematic variance and unexplained variance in returns, Strategic Manag. J., 20 (1999), 375-384. Google Scholar
[29]	C. K. Lee, Samsung-BYD link could open EV market, Korea Joongang Daily, 2016. Available from: http://koreajo\ongangdaily.joins.com/news/article/Article.aspx?aid=3021751. Google Scholar
[30]	M. Leng, Z. Li and L. Liang, Implications for the role of retailers in quality assurance, Produc. Oper. Manag., 25 (2016), 779-790. doi: 10.1111/poms.12501. Google Scholar
[31]	D. Li and A. Nagurney, A general multitiered supply chain network model of quality competition with suppliers, Internat. J. Produc. Econom., 170 (2015), 336-356. Google Scholar
[32]	W. Li and J. Chen, Backward integration strategy in a retailer Stackelberg supply chain, Omega, 75 (2018), 118-130. doi: 10.1016/j.omega.2017.03.002. Google Scholar
[33]	P. Ma, H. Wang and J. Shang, Contract design for two-stage supply chain coordination: Integrating manufacturer-quality and retailer-marketing efforts, Internat. J. Produc. Econom., 146 (2013), 745-755. doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2013.09.004. Google Scholar
[34]	P. Ma, H. Wang and J. Shang, Supply chain channel strategies with quality and marketing effort-dependent demand, Internat. J. Produc. Econom., 144 (2013), 572-581. doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2013.04.020. Google Scholar
[35]	N. M. Modak and S. Panda, Bargaining end customer prices for supply chain coordination in a declining price sensitive market, Internat. J. Manag. Sci. and Engineering Manag., 12 (2017), 68-78. doi: 10.1080/17509653.2015.1125309. Google Scholar
[36]	N. M. Modak, S. Panda and S. S. Sana, Two-echelon supply chain coordination among manufacturer and duopolies retailers with recycling facility, Internat. J. Adv. Manufac. Techn., 87 (2016), 1531-1546. doi: 10.1007/s00170-015-8094-y. Google Scholar
[37]	J. Z. Ni, B. B. Flynn and F. R. Jacobs, Impact of product recall announcements on retailers' financial value, Internat. J. Produc. Econom., 153 (2014), 309-322. doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2014.03.014. Google Scholar
[38]	R. Raj, Samsung invests $450mn in Chinese auto firm, Inshorts, 2016. Available from: https://www.inshorts.com/news/samsung-invests-%24450mn-in-chinese-auto-firm-1469124594106. Google Scholar
[39]	M. Seifbarghy, K. Nouhi and A. Mahmoudi, Contract design in a supply chain considering price and quality dependent demand with customer segmentation, Internat. J. Produc. Econom., 167 (2015), 108-118. doi: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2015.05.004. Google Scholar
[40]	X. F. Shao and J. H. Ji, Effects of sourcing structure on performance in a multiple-product assemble-to-order supply chain, European J. Oper. Res., 192 (2009), 981-1000. doi: 10.1016/j.ejor.2007.10.014. Google Scholar
[41]	K. Sharma, Factors determining India's export performance, J. Asian Econom., 14 (2003), 435-446. doi: 10.1016/S1049-0078(03)00036-8. Google Scholar
[42]	A. Sohdi, Temasek, IDG, Qualcomm lead $90m round for Xiaomi, AltAssets, 2011. Available from: https://www.altassets.net/private-equity-news/by-news-type/deal-news/temasek-idg-qualcomm-lead-90m-round-for-xiaomi.html. Google Scholar
[43]	G. Sošić, Impact of demand uncertainty on stability of supplier alliances in assembly models, Produc. Oper. Manag., 20 (2011), 905-920. doi: 10.1111/j.1937-5956.2010.01208.x. Google Scholar
[44]	G. Xie, W. Yue, S. Wang and K. K. Lai, Quality investment and price decision in a risk-averse supply chain, European J. Oper. Res., 214 (2011), 403-410. doi: 10.1016/j.ejor.2011.04.036. Google Scholar
[45]	X. Xu, Optimal price and product quality decisions in a distribution channel, Management Sci., 55 (2009), 1347-1352. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1090.1023. Google Scholar
[46]	D. Yang and T. Xiao, Coordination of a supply chain with loss-averse consumers in service quality, Internat. J. Produc. Res., 55 (2017), 3411-3430. doi: 10.1080/00207543.2016.1241444. Google Scholar
[47]	S. Yin, Alliance formation among perfectly complementary suppliers in a price-sensitive assembly system, Manufac. Service Oper. Manag., 12 (2010), 527-544. doi: 10.1287/msom.1090.0283. Google Scholar
[48]	J. Yu and S. Ma, Impact of decision sequence of pricing and quality investment in decentralized assembly system, J. Manufac. Systems, 32 (2013), 664-679. doi: 10.1016/j.jmsy.2013.02.004. Google Scholar
[49]	K. Zhu, R. Q. Zhang and F. Tsung, Pushing quality improvement along supply chains, Management Sci., 53 (2007), 421-436. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1060.0634. Google Scholar

Figure 1. Supplier invests in the manufacturer

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Figure 2. Impact of the supplier's investment on the demand in the SS model

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Figure 3. Response curves of the two players

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2020 Impact Factor: 1.801

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2020 Impact Factor: 1.801

American Institute of Mathematical Sciences

Supplier's investment in manufacturer's quality improvement with equity holding

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Supplier's investment in manufacturer's quality improvement with equity holding

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