Bundling and pricing decisions for bricks-and-clicks firms with consideration of network externality

Yeu-Shiang Huang; Chih-Chiang Fang; Pin-Chun Lin; Y. Chris Liao

doi:10.3934/jimo.2020081

Article Contents

2021, Volume 17, Issue 5: 2527-2555. Doi: 10.3934/jimo.2020081

This issue Previous Article A novel Chebyshev-collocation spectral method for solving the transport equation Next Article Relaxed successive projection algorithm with strong convergence for the multiple-sets split equality problem

Bundling and pricing decisions for bricks-and-clicks firms with consideration of network externality

1.
Department of Industrial and Information Management, Center for Innovative FinTech Business Models, National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan
2.
School of Computer Science and Software, Zhaoqing University, Guangdong, China
3.
Department of Industrial and Information Management, National Cheng Kung University, Taiwan
4.
Department of Finance, National Sun Yat-sen University, Taiwan

^* Corresponding author: Yeu-Shiang Huang
^* Corresponding author: Yeu-Shiang Huang

Received: July 2019

Revised: December 2019

Early access: April 2020

Published: September 2021

Abstract / Introduction Full Text(HTML) Figure(11) / Table(3) Related Papers Cited by

Abstract

The development of the Internet has dramatically changed firms' business models. Companies can now use both virtual and physical channels to enhance their competitiveness and profitability. In addition, bundling is a commonly used promotion strategy, although managers should consider the characteristics of the candidate bundled products. This study proposes a two-stage game theoretic model, in which a manufacturer may start an online channel along with an existing physical one which is operated by a dealer, i.e., a bricks-and-clicks approach, to examine the bundling and pricing strategy when selling two products with different network externalities. In the first stage, the manufacturer offers the products to the dealer, who may sell the two products individually or in a bundle to customers. In the second stage, and with the aim of expanding market share, the manufacturer may consider starting an online channel to integrate with the existing physical channel. We consider four cases, in which the manufacturer and dealer may sell the two products either individually or bundled in the two channels, in order to obtain the corresponding optimal pricing strategies with the aim of maximizing their profits. We also perform a numerical analysis to investigate the effects that network externality has on the bundling strategies and profits of the two channels. The results indicate that the bricks-and-clicks business model benefits both the manufacturer and dealer, and their profits would increase as network externality increases. In particular, when the network externalities of the two products are both high, a mixed strategy, which sells the two products in a bundle in the online channel and individually in the physical channel, should be adopted.

Keywords:

Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 58F15, 58F17; Secondary: 53C35.

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Figure 1. The Decision Zone for the Pure Component Strategy

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Figure 2. The Decision Zone for the Pure Bundling Strategy

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Figure 3. The Decision Zone for Different Cases with Different Network Externalities

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Figure 4. Effects of Network Externality and Consumers' Perceived Value on the Manufacturer's Profits

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Figure 5. Effects of the Related Costs on the Manufacturer's Profits

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Figure 6. The Effects of Transport Cost on Profits for the Manufacturer and Dealer

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Figure 7. The Effects of the Wholesale Price and Network Externality on the Profits

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Figure 8. The Effects of the Related Cost Factors on the Profit for the Manufacturer

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Figure 9. The Effects of the Inconvenience Cost on the Profits for Manufacturer and Dealer

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Figure 10. The Effects of the Inconvenience Cost on the Profits in the Four Cases

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Figure 11. The Effects of the Network Externality on the Profits in the Four Cases

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Table 1. The Bricks-and-Clicks Operation

		The Online Channel
		Pure component	Pure Bundling
The Physical Channel	Pure component	Ⅰ	Ⅲ
	Pure Bundling	Ⅳ	Ⅱ

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Table 2. Parameter Settings

Parameters	Values	Parameters	Values
$\delta _{1} $	0.5	$\delta _{2} $	0.3
$v_{1} $	34	$v_{2} $	20
$c_{1} $	5	$c_{2} $	3
$w_{1} $	20	$w_{2} $	12
$w_{B} $	29	$s$	16
$t$	20	$F$	1,200

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Table 3. The Optimal Selling Prices and Profits for the Manufacturer and Dealer

Strategy		Selling Price	Profit (＄000)	Total Profit (＄000)
The Physical Channel (The First Stage)	Pure Component	$p_{r1} =27$	$\pi _{C}^{R} {\rm =4.8789}$	15.4472
		$p_{r2} =16$	$\pi _{C}^{M} {\rm =10.5684}$
	Pure Bundling	$p_{rB} =41.5$	$\pi _{B}^{R} {\rm =15.1536}$	40.6116
			$\pi _{B}^{M} {\rm =25.4580}$
Bricks-and-Clicks (The Second Stage)	Case Ⅰ	$p_{d1} ={\rm 30.875}$	$\pi _{1}^{R} {\rm =26.1846}$	57.5858
		$p_{d2} ={\rm 23.415}$
		$p_{r1} ={\rm 33.0625}$	$\pi _{1}^{M} {\rm =31.4012}$
		$p_{r2} ={\rm 25.5125}$
	Case Ⅱ	$p_{rB} ={\rm 41.2}$	$\pi _{2}^{R} {\rm =15.6491}$	46.5392
		$p_{dB} ={\rm 38.84}$	$\pi _{2}^{M} {\rm =30.8901}$
	Case Ⅲ	$p_{r1} ={\rm 27.67}$	$\pi _{3}^{R} {\rm =4.9547}$	36.2380
		$p_{dB} ={\rm 40.78}$	$\pi _{3}^{M} {\rm =31.2833}$
	Case Ⅳ	$p_{rB} ={\rm 47.0175}$	$\pi _{4}^{R} {\rm =32.8094}$	58.6167
		$p_{d1} ={\rm 29.785}$	$\pi _{4}^{M} {\rm =25.8073}$

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