Prisoner's Dilemma on real social networks: Revisited

Sharon M. Cameron; Ariel Cintrón-Arias

doi:10.3934/mbe.2013.10.1381

Article Contents

2013, Volume 10, Issue 5&6: 1381-1398. Doi: 10.3934/mbe.2013.10.1381 open access

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Prisoner's Dilemma on real social networks: Revisited

Sharon M. Cameron^1, and
Ariel Cintrón-Arias^2,

1.
East Tennessee State University, Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Box 70663, Johnson City, TN 37614-1701
2.
East Tennessee State University, Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Institute for Quantitative Biology, Box 70663, Johnson City, TN 37614-1701

Received: August 2012

Revised: October 2012

Published: August 2013

Abstract / Introduction Related Papers Cited by

Abstract

Prisoner's Dilemma is a game theory model used to describe altruistic behavior seen in various populations. This theoretical game is important in understanding why a seemingly selfish strategy does persist and spread throughout a population that is mixing homogeneously at random. For a population with structure determined by social interactions, Prisoner's Dilemma brings to light certain requirements for the altruistic strategy to become established. Monte Carlo simulations of Prisoner's Dilemma are carried out using both simulated social networks and a dataset of a real social network. In both scenarios we confirm the requirements for the persistence of altruism in a population.

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Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 91A40; Secondary: 91D30.

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