Optimal individual strategies for influenza vaccines with imperfect efficacy and durability of protection

Francesco Salvarani; Gabriel Turinici

doi:10.3934/mbe.2018028

Article Contents

2018, Volume 15, Issue 3: 629-652. Doi: 10.3934/mbe.2018028

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Optimal individual strategies for influenza vaccines with imperfect efficacy and durability of protection

Francesco Salvarani^1, and
Gabriel Turinici^2, ,

1.
Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University, CNRS UMR 7534, CEREMADE, 75016 Paris, France, & Università degli Studi di Pavia, Dipartimento di Matematica, 27100 Pavia, Italy,
2.
Université Paris-Dauphine, PSL Research University, CNRS UMR 7534, CEREMADE, 75016 Paris, France, & Institut Universitaire de France, Paris, France

* Corresponding author: Gabriel Turinici
* Corresponding author: Gabriel Turinici

Received: March 2017

Accepted: July 29, 2017

Published: June 2018

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Abstract

We analyze a model of agent based vaccination campaign against influenza with imperfect vaccine efficacy and durability of protection. We prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium by Kakutani's fixed point theorem in the context of non-persistent immunity. Subsequently, we propose and test a novel numerical method to find the equilibrium. Various issues of the model are then discussed, such as the dependence of the optimal policy with respect to the imperfections of the vaccine, as well as the best vaccination timing. The numerical results show that, under specific circumstances, some counter-intuitive behaviors are optimal, such as, for example, an increase of the fraction of vaccinated individuals when the efficacy of the vaccine is decreasing up to a threshold. The possibility of finding optimal strategies at the individual level can help public health decision makers in designing efficient vaccination campaigns and policies.

Keywords:

Mathematics Subject Classification: Primary: 92D30; Secondary: 92C42, 60J20, 91A13.

Citation:

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Figure 1. Two possible forms for the function $A$.

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Figure 2. Individual model.

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Figure 5. Results for Subsection 4.3.1. Top: the optimal converged strategy $\xi^{MFG}$ at times $\{t_0,...,t_{N-1} \}$. The weight of the non-vaccinating pure strategy (i.e., corresponding to time $t = \infty$) is $68\%$. Bottom: the corresponding cost $\mathcal{C}_{\xi^{MFG}}$. The red line corresponds to the cost of the non-vaccinating pure strategy $(\mathcal{C}_{\xi^{MFG}})_{N+1}$.

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Figure 3. The optimal converged strategy $\xi^{MFG}$ at times $\{t_0,...,t_{N-1} \}$ for subsection 4.2, case $\mathcal{M}_1$. The weight of the non-vaccinating pure strategy (i.e., corresponding to time $t = \infty$) is $88\%$; this means that $12\%$ of the population vaccinates.

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Figure 4. The optimal converged strategy $\xi^{MFG}$ at times $\{t_0,...,t_{N-1} \}$ for subsection 4.2, case $\mathcal{M}_2$. Here $15\%$ of the population vaccinates.

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Figure 6. Results of Subsection 4.3.1. Top: the evolution of the susceptible class $S_n$; bottom: the (total) infected class $I_n$.

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Figure 7. The decrease of the incentive to change strategy $E(\xi_k)$. Note that $E(\xi_k)$ does not decrease monotonically. In fact, there is no reason to expect such a behavior, since we are not minimizing $E(\cdot)$ in a monotonic fashion.

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Figure 8. Results of Subsection 4.3.2. Top: the optimal converged strategy $\xi^{MFG}$. The weight of the non-vaccinating pure strategy (i.e., corresponding to time $t = \infty$) is $91\%$. Bottom: the corresponding cost $\mathcal{C}_{\xi^{MFG}}$. The thin horizontal line corresponds to the cost of the non-vaccinating pure strategy $(\mathcal{C}_{\xi^{MFG}})_{N+1}$.

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Table 1. Results for the Subsection 4.4. Individual vaccination policy with respect to the failed vaccination rate of the vaccine.

Failed vaccination rate $f$	Vaccination rate $1-\xi_\infty$
$0.00$	$5.04 \%$
$0.25$	$5.94 \%$
$0.50$	$7.02 \%$
$0.55$	$7.20\%$
$0.60$	$7.29\%$
$0.65$	$7.23 \%$
$0.75$	$5.74 \%$
$0.80$	$2.93 \%$
$0.85$	$0.00 \%$

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