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2015, 2015(special): 745-753. doi: 10.3934/proc.2015.0745

Strategic games in a competitive market: Feedback from the users' environment

1. 

University of Cambridge, Wilberforce Road, Cambridge, CB30WA, United Kingdom

Received  September 2014 Revised  July 2015 Published  November 2015

We propose a model for the dynamics of a competitive market, in which strategic decision making of market players may be affected by the users' switching behaviour. A novel concept, habitual attraction, is introduced to reflect the resistance of users against changing their routinely used provider. The model can be adopted for a particular market and allows for dynamic learning. We demonstrate applications of the model to the internet search market in the context of competition law and regulation, where a user centred description is essential, for instance, in the anti-trust proceedings.
Citation: Natalia Kudryashova. Strategic games in a competitive market: Feedback from the users' environment. Conference Publications, 2015, 2015 (special) : 745-753. doi: 10.3934/proc.2015.0745
References:
[1]

M. Armstrong, Competition in two-sided markets, The RAND Journal of Economics, 37 (2006), 668-691.

[2]

S. Athey and G. Ellison, Position auctions with consumer search, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126 (2011), 1213-1270.

[3]

S. Athey and D. Nekipelov, A structural model of sponsored search advertising auctions, Sixth ad auctions workshop.

[4]

J. Chen, D. Liu and A. B. Whinston, Auctioning keywords in online search, Journal of Marketing, 73 (2009), 125-141.

[5]

Y. Chen and C. He, Paid placement: Advertising and search on the internet, Economic Journal, 121 (2011), F309-F328.

[6]

M. O. Edelman B. and M. Schwarz, Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords, American Economic Review, 97 (2007), 242-259.

[7]

D. G. Goldstein, R. P. McAfee and S. Suri, The cost of annoying ads, in WWW2013, 459-470.

[8]

A. Hassan, R. Jones and K. L. Klinkner, Beyond dcg: user behavior as a predictor of a successful search, in ACM WSDM 2010, 221-230.

[9]

K. Iyer, R. Johari and M. Sundararajan, Mean field equilibria of dynamic auctions with learning, SIGecom Exch., 10 (2011), 10-14.

[10]

N. Kudryashova, The market of internet sponsored links in the context of competition law: Can modeling help?, WWW2014, 331-332.

[11]

T. G. Kurtz, Limit theorems for sequences of jump markov processes approximating ordinary differential processes, Journal of Applied Probability, 8 (1971), pp. 344-356.

[12]

J. Li, S. Huffman and A. Tokuda, Good abandonment in mobile and pc internet search, in ACM SIGIR 2009, 43-50.

[13]

J.-C. Rochet and J. Tirole, Platform competition in two-sided markets, Journal of the European Economic Association, 1 (2003), 990-1029.

[14]

G. Taylor, Search quality and revenue cannibalization by competing search engines, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 445-467.

[15]

H. R. Varian, Position auctions, Int. J. of Industrial Organization, 25 (2007), 1163-1178.

[16]

N. N. Vorobâev, Game theory, Springer, 1977.

[17]

L. Xu, J. Chen and A. Whinston, Effects of the presence of organic listing in search advertising, Information Systems Research, 23 (2012), 1284-1302.

show all references

References:
[1]

M. Armstrong, Competition in two-sided markets, The RAND Journal of Economics, 37 (2006), 668-691.

[2]

S. Athey and G. Ellison, Position auctions with consumer search, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126 (2011), 1213-1270.

[3]

S. Athey and D. Nekipelov, A structural model of sponsored search advertising auctions, Sixth ad auctions workshop.

[4]

J. Chen, D. Liu and A. B. Whinston, Auctioning keywords in online search, Journal of Marketing, 73 (2009), 125-141.

[5]

Y. Chen and C. He, Paid placement: Advertising and search on the internet, Economic Journal, 121 (2011), F309-F328.

[6]

M. O. Edelman B. and M. Schwarz, Internet advertising and the generalized second-price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords, American Economic Review, 97 (2007), 242-259.

[7]

D. G. Goldstein, R. P. McAfee and S. Suri, The cost of annoying ads, in WWW2013, 459-470.

[8]

A. Hassan, R. Jones and K. L. Klinkner, Beyond dcg: user behavior as a predictor of a successful search, in ACM WSDM 2010, 221-230.

[9]

K. Iyer, R. Johari and M. Sundararajan, Mean field equilibria of dynamic auctions with learning, SIGecom Exch., 10 (2011), 10-14.

[10]

N. Kudryashova, The market of internet sponsored links in the context of competition law: Can modeling help?, WWW2014, 331-332.

[11]

T. G. Kurtz, Limit theorems for sequences of jump markov processes approximating ordinary differential processes, Journal of Applied Probability, 8 (1971), pp. 344-356.

[12]

J. Li, S. Huffman and A. Tokuda, Good abandonment in mobile and pc internet search, in ACM SIGIR 2009, 43-50.

[13]

J.-C. Rochet and J. Tirole, Platform competition in two-sided markets, Journal of the European Economic Association, 1 (2003), 990-1029.

[14]

G. Taylor, Search quality and revenue cannibalization by competing search engines, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 445-467.

[15]

H. R. Varian, Position auctions, Int. J. of Industrial Organization, 25 (2007), 1163-1178.

[16]

N. N. Vorobâev, Game theory, Springer, 1977.

[17]

L. Xu, J. Chen and A. Whinston, Effects of the presence of organic listing in search advertising, Information Systems Research, 23 (2012), 1284-1302.

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