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Journal of Dynamics and Games (JDG)
 

Paths to stability in the assignment problem
Pages: 257 - 287, Issue 3/4, July/October 2015

doi:10.3934/jdg.2015004      Abstract        References        Full text (538.5K)           Related Articles

Bettina Klaus - Faculty of Business and Economics, University of Lausanne, Internef 538, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland (email)
Frédéric Payot - Federal Department of Economic A airs, Education and Research, SECO, CH-3003 Bern, Switzerland (email)

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